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PREFACE 
At a time when North Vietnam's reaction to the 
policies of the United States is of such great 
importance to Americans, it is incumbent that every 
effort be made to understand the effect that past 
American actions have had on the Hanoi leaders. This 
study helps clarify the often misrepresented events 
surrounding Hanoi's unsuccessful efforts to bring 
about the reunification of Vietnam through the 
elections prescribed by the Geneva Agreements for 
1956. Through its examination of these events it 
provides insights helpful to a better appreciation 
of both North Vietnam's current attitudes toward the 
United States and its approach to a peaceful settle­
ment. Since the North Vietnamese leaders are 
convinced that Saigon, with Washington's encouragement 
and backing, was responsible for thwarting the Geneva 
plans for Vietnam's reunification, they are likely to 
reject any offers of negotiations by the United States 
which are predicated on the assumption that the war 
is one of aggression from the North. 
Mr. Weinstein, a member of the Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program, has, in my judgment, carried out his 
research into this issue further than any other 
scholar who has written on the subject. I believe 
that his findings will contribute to a better under­
standing of Hanoi's attitude towards the present war 
and the role of the United States in Vietnam. 
George McT. Kahin 
Director 
Southeast Asia Program 
Ithaca, New York 
25 July 1966 
V 

• • 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • 
II. THE AGREEMENT TO HOLD ELECTIONS • • • 
III. WERE ELECTIONS EVER REALLY POSSIBLE? 
IV. WHY WERE ELECTIONS NOT HELD? • • • • 
EPILOGUE. THE FAILURE TO HOLD ELECTIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENTr. • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Page 
• • • • • • 1 
• • • • • • 4 
• • • • • • 20 
• • • • • • 24 
SOME 
• • • • • • 53 
• • • • • • 60 
Vl.l. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
The events surrounding the failure to hold the Vietnamese 
reunification elections scheduled for 1956 have been subject
to the most grotesque distortion. Perhaps it should not be 
surprising that strong Diem partisans have insisted that Ho 
Chi Minh prevented the holding of elections. One such writer 
has argued that elections failed to take place because Ho was 
"never prepared to acce_pt anything resembling the· free elec­
ti ons concept involving international observers or moni-
tors, as envisaged by the Geneva Agreements.r11 1 Another bland­
ly asserts: "When the Communist North refused to hold free 
elections, Diem _proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam. 11 2 It is,
however, sim_ply impossible to find any evidence that Ho ever 
questioned the right of the International Control Commission 
(ICC) to su_pervise the elections or that he in any·other way
"refused" to hold free elections. 
Nevertheless, the effort to blame Ho for the failure to 
hold elections is not confined to a fringe of fervent Diem 
admirers. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for 
the Far East, has sought to expose the 11 myth 11 that the Diem 
government, sup_ported by the us, obstructed the holding of 
elections called for by the Geneva Agreeme.nts. According to 
Bundy, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) repeatedly 
called for free elections "in its propaganda,r" but when the 
issue arose "concretely" in 1956 the DRV "made no effort" to 
res_pond to the cal 1 of the Geneva Conference co-chairmen. 3 
1. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: 
Harper, 1965), pp. 10-11. Miss Higgins believes that the 
US made a grave mistake in _permitting the 1963 overthrow 
of Diem. 
2. Anthony T. Bouscaren, The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of 
Vietnam (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965),
P• 53..
3. William P. Bundy, "South Viet-Nam: Reality and Myth,r11 
speech delivered before the Dallas Council on World Af­
fairs, Dallas, Texas, 13 May 1965. Bundy is apparently 
referring to the co-chairmen's 8 May 1956 letter inviting
"the authorities in both parts of Viet-Nam" to transmit 
to the Co-Chairmen "their views about the time required
for the opening of consultations on the organization of 
nation-wide elections and the time required for the hold­
ing of elections.r" The text of the letter is in Documents 
Relatin to British Involvement in Indochina, 1945-1965 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965r, Cmnd. 
2834]. 
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Bundy's allegation is easy to refute, for the DRV's response
to the 1956 message of Britain and the USSR is a matter of 
record. 4 Lest Bundy's statement be dismissed as merely the 
result of a regrettable oversight, the words of other State 
Department officials should be consulted. Addressing himself 
to the ''charge that the United States violated the 1954 Geneva 
accords by not sup_porting elections in 1956, 11 u. Alexis John­
son, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
has offered this version of the failure to hold elections: 
In 1955 and 1956 the south Vietnamese Government 
maintained that it would agree to such elections if they 
were genuinely free and internationally supervised
throughout Vietnam and not just in South Vietnam. The 
United States, although not a party to the Geneva ac­
cords, consistently favored genuinely free elections 
under UN supervision, as has been our consistent provi­
sion and that of most members of the UN with respect to 
Korea. It was clear, however, in 1956 that no more than 
any other Communist government was the Hanoi government
prepared to allow such elections, and accordingly the 
elections were not held. Thus it is a travesty on the 
truth to allege that the present situation was brought
about by the failure of the South to carry out the 1954 
accords. In fact, it was the North that was not willing
to submit itself to the test of free elections under 
international control. 5 
It is ironic that Johnson, whose description neither is nor 
can be supported by evidence, should s_peak of a "travesty on 
the truth.r" 
Though the incredible amount of misrepresentation on the 
subject of elections in Vietnam is itself cause for concern,
there is another type of argument which is more disturbing.
Some informed cormnentators have sought to dismiss the whole 
question by saying that the idea of elections was always un­
realistic, even "fraudulent.r" Because no Communist state has 
4. For a report of the DRV's reply, see The Times (London),
16 July 1956. Besides answering the co-chairmen's letter,
Pham Van Dong dispatched on 11 May a letter to Ngo Dinh 
Diem calling for consultations on elections. Diem did 
not respond to the offer. For the text of Dongr's letter, 
see Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 May 1956. 
5. Address by u. Alexis Johnson before the Canadian Club of 
Montreal at Montreal, Canada, on 14 March 1966, in Depart­
ment of State Bulletin, LIV, no. 1397 (4 April 1966), 530. 
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ever conducted a free election, one has argued, it is unreal­
istic to attach great importance to the elections set for.
1956.6 
It is a serious mistake to dispose of the history of the 
Geneva Agreements' election Provision in this manner. If it.
is, as government spokesmen affirm, so very important that 
the US position be made Patently clear to its Communist ad­. .
versary, it can hardly be less essential that the US make 
every effort to understand the mind of its opponent.. Whether 
the war in Vietnam is seen as an attempt by North Vietnam to 
conquer the neighboring_country of South Vietnam or as a 
justifiable effort by partisans of north and south to insist 
on the unity of their country recognized by all at Geneva, it 
is impossible to ignore the that the failure holdfact · to 
elections was closely related to the later resumption of 
violence. Thus, the question of elections in Vietnam deserves 
serious attention not merely as a matter of setting the record 
straight: an appreciation of the history of elections and the 
DRV' s efforts at "_peaceful reunification" of Vietnam is vital 
to any understanding of how the present war began and how 
Hanoi Perceives its character today. The role of Hanoi's ad­.
versaries and allies in the _process by which the promised
elections were undermined also helps illuminate the DRV's 
understanding of the international context of the war and ul­
timately of the international position of the DRV. 
6. See Robert A. Sea la_pino' s remarks in "Excerpts from 
National Teach-In on Viet-Nam Policy, 11· 15 May 1965, in 
Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), The Viet­
Nam Reader (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 300. 
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II. THE AGREEMENT TO HOLD ELECTIONS 
From the outset both the Viet Minh and the French-spon­
sored Bao Dai regime _proclaimed their support of two fundamen­
tal principles--the indivisibility of Vietnam and the use of 
general elections to establish a unified government for the 
country. It had been evident in late April 1954 that neither 
the Communists nor the French had any desire to discuss the 
partition of Indochina as the basis for a solution. 7 The Viet 
Minh reportedly _preferred a coalition government com.posed of 
representatives of the French-sponsored State of Vietnam and 
Viet Minh elements. They expected that such a coalition 
government would conduct elections which, in the prevailing 
atmosphere of Viet Minh victory over the French, would give
Ho Chi Minh's followers overwhelming support throughout Viet­
nam. B 
The pro_posal to hold nationwide elections first was made 
at Geneva on 10 May 1954 by Pham Van Dong, head of the Viet 
Minh delegation. Two days earlier French Foreign Minister 
Georges Bidault had pro.posed a cease-fire accompanied by with­
drawal of military forces into assembly zones. Though he had 
admitted that elections would have to be held eventually, he 
felt that such a political settlement should be considered 
only at some indefinite date.r9 Dong, however, insisted that 
a .political solution through elections should be made the 
Geneva Conference's concern. Dong's plan, which envisaged a 
military regroupment similar to that advocated by Bidault, 
called for free general elections to be organized by Advisory 
7. On the State of Vietnam's efforts to extract from each of 
the three major Western powers at Geneva a commitment a­
gainst _partition, see New York Times, 2 May 1954. The US, 
at the start of the Geneva Conference, was adamantly
against partition. (By the end of May, however, it had 
decided that partition was the best settlement France 
could hope for under the circumstances. ) The French con­
sidered partition unsatisfactory in light of their respon­
sibilities to the three Associated States. The British,
however, considered temporary partition a promising ap­
proach, based on the assumption that it was better to 
save part of Indochina by cutting off the "diseased limb.r" 
See Ngo Ton Oat, "The Geneva Partition of Vietnam and the 
Question of Reunification During the First Two Yearsr" 
(unpublished Ph.rD. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963), 
pp. 1 14-119. See also New York Times, 26 May 1954. 
8. New York Times, 28 April 1954. 
9. New York Times, 11 May 1954 and 24 June 1954. 
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Conferences re_presenting the authorities on both sides. The 
Advisory Conferences were to meet "under conditions of secur­
ing freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and 
social organizations," and the subsequent elections would be 
su_pervised by local commissions.10 The Western _powers, which 
had hoped that the, DRV would be satisfied with a cease-fire 
based on the existing holdings, were dismayed at Dong's having 
made a cessation of hostilities de_pendent on the simultaneous 
acceptance of _political provisions which could be expected 
to bring DRV control to the rest of Vietnam.11 
The State of Vietn�m delegation rejected Dong's proposal. 
The position of Bao Dai's state, enunciated on 12 May, was 
that a cease-fire without regroupment should be declared and 
an el ection held under UN auspices,· but only after Bao Dai's 
authority over all Vietnam had been explicitly recognized and 
State of Vietnam control established throughout the country.12 
The State of Vietnam proposal explicitly rejected any sort of 
_partition, "direct or indirect, definitive or temporary, de-
facto or de Jure." The Saigon regime believed that any 
settlement would have to involve the destruction of the Viet 
Minh _political and military apparatus and should include 
safeguards against the Viet Minh's continuing its struggle by 
legal means after disarmament.13 The extreme charac·ter of the 
State of Vietnam proposal suggests that the Bao Dai regime was 
not seriously interested in a cease-fire. Saigon's apparent 
suspicion that any form of military regroupment might lead to 
_partition was reflected in its pro_posal for a cease-f_ire based 
on the _present positions. Yet, Prince Buu Loe, premier of 
the State of Vietnam, two months earlier had described such a 
cease-fire as "impractical" because the rival forces were too 
scrambled together to permit its implementation.14 In any 
case, there is no evidence that the State of Vietnam recom­
mendation ever received serious consideration. 
10. New China News Agency dis.patch, 10 May 1954. 
11. New York Times, 16 May 1954. 
12. The text of the State of Vietnam proposal is in Cmnd. 
2834. On.the next to last day of the conference, the 
State of Vietnam delegation circulated a new plan for a 
cease-fire with small regrouping areas and the placing 
of the entire country under UN control until security 
was sufficient for elections. This proposal was not 
taken seriously. New York Times, 20 July 1954 and 
19 July 1954. 
13. New York Times, 2 May 1954. 
14. New York Times, 2 March 1954. 
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133. 
Although the Western _powers were somewhat pessimistic
following Dong I s pro_posa 1, hopes soon were revived when the 
conference reached agreement on the principle that it should 
w:::>rk for a mi litary armistice before discussing the details 
of a politicarl settlement.r15 The only noteworthy early pro­
gress with respect to a politicarl settlement was Soviet 
Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov Is _proposarl on 14 May that the 
elections might be supervised by a commission of neutral 
nations.r16 This was an im.�rtant advance, for it removed the 
question of elections in Vietnam from the category of similar 
proposals made by the Communists for elections in Korea and 
Germany without international su_pervision. 
On 25 May Pham Van Dong suggested that opposing forces 
might be withdrawn into large zones. The earrlier Bidault and 
Dong proposals had not generally been considered tantamount 
to _partition, because the assumption was that there would be 
a series of several regrou_pment zonesrl7 thus making it unlikely 
that a political division could be inferred. But Dong's large 
zone plan evoked violent outcries from the State of Vietnam 
representatives, who denounced the proposal as a plan to de­
stroy the countryr's unity.r18 The DRV insisted with vehemence 
on the integrity of Vietnam but argued that a cease-fire could 
not effectively be maintained without a regroupment of mili­
tary forces into distinct areas. As the DRVr's Hoang Van Hoan 
put it, "zonal readjustment" was essential to enforce a cease­
fire, but it was "only a tem_porary measure which will _pave
the way for the realization of our territorial and political 
unity by means of free and democratic elections. Allegations
that we want to partition the national territory will cer­
tainly not be abl e to withstand the facts of reality.r11 19 
Radio Peking accused the State of Vietnam delegate of delib­
erately confusing zonal readjustment with partition.r20 
The question of a pol iticarl settrlement returned with a 
jo lt on 8 June when Molotov announced that the Soviet govern­
ment considered it necessary "to examine without further de lay
the political questions.r" Molotov stressed that the Geneva 
15. Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), P•.
16. New York Times, 16 May 1954. 
17. New York Times, 24 June 1954. 
18. France-Asie, 6 June 1954. See also New York Times,
26 May 1954. 
19. New China News Agency dispatch, 31 May 1954. 
20. Ibid. 
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Conference could not "kee_p silence" on the question of elec­
tions for Vietnam.2 1 Following Molotov's speech the DRV re­
newed its call for elections 0 as soon as possible" after the 
termination of hostilities, strongly supporting Molotov's in­
sistence that the political questions .must be settled simul­
taneously with military ones.22 In raising the question of a 
_political solution to the same level as the cease-fire,
Molotov had made it clear that Dong's May 10 demands would be 
sup_ported and, in so doing, he reduced Bidaul t' s policy to a 
bankru_ptcy. Shortly afterwards, Bidault I s prime minister,
Jose_ph Laniel, was voted out of office. 
On 24 June it was reported that France's new prime minis­
ter, Pierre Mendes-France, had met with Chou En-lai at Bern 
and agreed that the Geneva Conference must reach a political
settlement as well as a cease-fire. It was agreed that re­
gardless of the respective areas held by each side under an 
armistice, a unified government must be established based on 
all-Vietnam elections.2 3 The Chinese apparently understood 
Mendes-France to have agreed to elections within 18 months.2 4 
Five days later Chou was in New Delhi, where it was reported
that any _political _partition of Vietnam would be unacceptable 
to either Nehru or the Chinese premier.25 It was generally
understood that the Communists were determined to win all of 
Vietnam.26 
Clearly worried about the concessions Mendes-France ap­
peared willing to make, the us obtained British agreement on 
the t ext of a joint message sent to France on 29 June. The 
communique stated the willingness of the two countries to re­
s.pect an armistice which fulfilled seven points, one among
which was: "Does not contain _political .Provisions which would 
risk loss of the retained area to Communist control. 11 2 7 
21. New York Times, 9 June 1954 and 13  June 1954. 
22. New China News Agency dispatch, 17  June 1954. 
23. New York Times, 24 June 1954. 
2 4. New China News Agency dispatch, 18 July 1954. According
to this dispatch, "The French delegation originally pro­
posed 18 months after an armistice for the elections." 
That Chou understood Mendes-France at Bern to-have agreed
to early elections is also reported in New York Times,
18 July 1954. 
25. New York Times, 29 June 1954. 
26. Ibid. 
2 7. Eden, Full Circle, p. 149. 
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Mendes-France, trying to persuade Dulles to return to Geneva 
on 12 July, insisted that Dulles' suspicion that he would de­
_part from the seven points was wholly unjustified. 28 Accord­
ingly, the French toughened their _position and refused to 
agree to any definite date for the elections. On 16 July it 
was reported that France, backed by the us, was determined not.
to fix an election date, even if the Communists made it the 
price for agreeing to an armistice. 29 Although the British 
doubted that France would be able to induce the Communists to 
agree to an armistice if that determination held,r30 the ques­
tion of setting a date for elections remained until 18 July 
an area where compromise was re_ported impossible. 3 1 By then 
the Communists, who had insisted on elections within six 
months, were willing to wait a year.r32 At this point Mendes­
France, having just reached agreement with the Communists on 
the composition of a supervisory cormnission, made clear that 
he was _prepared to compromise on the election question. The 
Communists were believed willing to accept an 18-month delay,
and the French _reportedly ho_ped they could get that _period
lengthened to two years. 3r3 After two more days of bargaining, 
during which France pro_posed two years and the DRV held out 
for 18 months, agreement was finally reached on the afternoon 
of 20 July that reunification elections would be held in two 
years.r34 
By far the most important concession made by France at 
Geneva was Mendes-France's decision to agree to a s_pecific
date for elections. Radio Moscow rightly described the setting 
of a date for elections as "of enormous political importance.r11 35 
The Communists' achievement meant the difference between a 
military division with _prospects of complete control within two 
years and a partition with a vague prospect of elections which,
like the comparable prospect in Korea, might never material­
ize.r36 It is not hard to understand why France felt compelled 
28. Ibid.r, pp. 156-157. 
29. New York Times, 16 July 1954. 
30. Ibid. 
3 1. New York Times, 18 July 1954. 
32. New China News Agency dispatch, 18 July 1954. 
33. New York Times, 19 July 1954. 
34. Eden, Full Circle, p. 159. 
35. Soviet Home Service, 22 July 1954. 
36. This is the comparison drawn in New York Times, 18 July 
1954, at a time when it was thought that the DRV would 
get only the latter. 
37. 
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to make such a great concession, Mendes-France's assurances 
to Dulles notwithstanding. The Communists had made it abun­
dantly clear that they simply would not accept a truce without 
a .Political settlement, i.e., a fixed date for elections. 
Besides France's general war-weariness, the rapid deteriora­
tion of the military situation in Vietnam put strong pressure
on Mendes-France to accede to DRV demands and thereby facili­
tate a settlement. If it seemed likely that France would 
los e all of Vietnam militarily, 37 the prospect of a political
settlement which at worst would .Produce the same result must 
have seemed reasonable. Furthermore, the DRV, under .Pressure 
from Molotov and Chou En-lai, had progressively reduced its 
demands on several im_portant issues, most notably by abandon­
ing its original _pro.posal of "zonal readjustment" at the 13th 
,parallel (which would have corresponded to the actual mili­
tary situation) and settling for the 17th parallel, a consid­
erable loss of hard-won territory. The DRV made those conces­
sions only because of the promise that elections would be held 
in 1956.38 
It is reas onable to ask why the DRV, with military vic­
tory apparently in sight, was willing to concede so much in 
exchange for the promis e of elections. The DRV clearly was 
unhappy about the concessions it was forced to make.3 9  Much 
In mid-May some "admittedly pessimistic" Western sources 
had _predicted Viet Minh control of all Vietnam within 11 a 
few months, " barring US intervention (which, of course, 
carried its own risks of internationalizing and expanding
the war). New York Times, 16 May 1954. Ten days later 
it was admitted by US officials that the military situa­
tion was sli_p_ping faster than had been ex.pected. New 
York Times, 26 May 1954. By the start of July, the 
French had retreated from the entire southeastern quar­
ter of the Red River delta, a "loss far worse than Dien 
Bien Phu." New York Times, 4 July 1954. 
38. Philippe Devillers, in a lecture at Cornell University, 
13 December 1965. On the point that the setting of the. 
date for elections was in exchange for the DRV's conces­
sions on the armistice line, see Jean Lacouture et Phi­
lippe Devillers, La fin d'une guerre (Paris: editions 
du seuil, 1960), p. 268. 
39. Ibid. As the New York Times, 25 July 1954, put it: 
"Viet Minh leaders are not entirely haP.PY about the peace 
settlement in Vietnam. A number of members of the Viet 
Minh delegation have declared openly that pressure from 
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet Foreign
Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov forced their regime to 
accept less than it rightfully should have obtained 
here." 
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has been made of the pressure exerted by Chou and Molotov,40 
both of whom were more interested in preventing the war's ex­
pansion than in maximizing the DRV's gains. 41 But ·the influ­
ence of the major Communist powers, great though it was, prob­
ably could not have forced the DRV to give up its hard won 
gains without a good pros_pect of retrieving them. The DRV 
undoubtedly understood that a refusal to compromise would have 
made a settlement impossible and might well have brought US 
military intervention as the Viet Minh pressed close to total 
military victory.42 But the _possibility of winning the coun­
try through elections subject to international supervision 
must have seemed one that us power could not prevent. A vic­
tory through elections must also have a_p_pealed to the DRV as 
a way of gaining its objectives without paying the costs of 
continued war. Finally, the DRV leaders probably saw the 
cession of territory to the French and the delay until elec­
tions as an unavoidable device to enable France to save face. 
Confident of electoral victory, the DRV had made a bargain 
which, if less than what had been expected, nevertheless 
seemed to promise the ultimate achievement of the DRV's aims. 
What the DRV got with respect to elections was embodied 
in Paragraph Seven of the conference's Final Declaration, 
issued on 21 July 1954. The election provision also was rec­
ognized in Article 14 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostil­
ities, signed by the military commands of France and the DRV 
as the competent authorities in the two zones. The relevant 
_portion of the Final Declaration reads as follows: 
7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is 
concerned, the settlement of _political problems, effected 
on the basis of respect for the principles of independ­
ence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the 
Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, 
guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a 
result of free general elections by secret ballot. In 
order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restora­
tion of peace has been made, and that all the necessary 
conditions obtain for free expression of the national 
will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956, under 
40. See Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 250-254. See 
also New York Times, 25 July 1954. 
41. See New York Times, 25 April 1954, and Ngo Ton Dat, 
..Geneva Partition and the Question of Reunification," 
p. 296. 
42. US officials had made it clear that if the DRV insisted 
on extreme terms, the US would have to consider seriously 
military intervention. See New York Times, 26 May 1954. 
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the supervision of an international commission composed
of representatives of the Member States of the Interna­
tional Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agree­
ment on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will 
be held on this subject between the· competent represen­
tative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 
onwards.43 
It is clear that the Final Declaration made an unconditional 
promise of elections by July 1956 and directed that consulta­
tions44 about elections begin after one year. Fundamental 
freedoms, according to the declaration, were to be guaranteed
by democratic institutions established as a result of the 
elections. There was absolutely no suggestion that democratic 
institutions had to exist before the elections could be held� 
on the contrary, the declaration clearly stated that the 
elections were to precede the establishment of such institu­
tions.t45 Similarly, the declaration held that a purpose of 
the elections was to ensure the existence of necessary condi­
tions for free expression of the national will. There is no 
basis for assuming that those conditions had to precede the 
election which was itself designed to ensure their existence.t46 
43. My underlining. The text of the Final Declaration is 
available in Raskin and Fall (eds.), The Viet-Nam Reader, 
pp. 96-99. 
44. The Geneva Conference's failure to specify details of 
the pro_posed elections is probably at least partially
attributable to the lack of time remaining after the 
agreement on elections late the afternoon of 20 July.
No one was eager to raise any new issues for debate at 
this stage. 
45. The conference could not have expected the existence of 
democratic institutions before the elections, inasmuch 
as the southern zone was e.x_plicitly to remain under 
colonial French civil and military administration. 
46 . Exemplary of the manner in which parts of this provision
have been quoted out of context to make the elections 
dependent on preconditions is this passage from an edi­
torial in New York Times, 6 April 1956: "The plain fact 
is that neither the truce cormnission nor the signatories 
to the Geneva Agreement have as yet established in 
North Vietnam the essential conditions provided by the 
agreement for a 'free expression of the national will ••••' 
In these circumstances, Mr. Diem ••• is duty-bound to 
reject the proposed elections until the necessary condi­.
tions for freedom have been established in the North." 
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The declaration received the verbal assent of all partici­
pants except the State of Vietnam and the us, but the latter 
did declare its intention not to threaten or use force to 
undermine the Geneva Agreements and to continue to seek reuni­
fication through free elections {though under UN supervision).r47 
The State of Vietnam issued a declaration protesting against
the conditions of the agreement and reserving "full freedom of 
action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Viet­
namese people to territorial unity, national independence and 
freedom.r11 48 The State of Vietnam statement specifically pro­
tested the fixing of a date for elections without its consent. 
Because the Final Declaration was denounced by the State 
of Vietnam and received only verbal assent,r4 9  some have ques­
tioned whether it is legally binding.rSO With respect to the 
State of Vietnam's insistence that France had no right to set 
a date for electirons, Mendes-France simply reasserted that 
the French High Conunand had "acted within the framework of 
its competency and its attributions.r11 5 1  The State of Vietnam's 
objection was largely ignored because, as stated in the armi­
stice agreenent, "Pending the general elections which will 
bring about the reunification of Vietnam, the conduct of 
civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the 
hands of the _party whose forces are to be regrouped there in 
virtue of the present agreement.r" That France was in fact 
the sovereign authority in non-Conununist Vietnam seems evi­
dent. Some have been misled by the conclusion of a "treaty
of independence" between France and the State of Vietnam on 
4 June 1954. 52 The treaty proclaimed France• s reco,qnition of 
47. The text of the us statement is in Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva 
Partition and the Question of Reunification,r" pp. 464-
465. 
48. Text in ibid. , p. 466. 
4 9. The declaration was unsigned because Chinese insistence 
that all countries at the conference, including the un­
willing us, give written assent threatened to wreck the 
settlement at the last moment. Molotov and Eden agreed
that the declaration should have a heading which listed 
all the participants, thus eliminating the problem of 
signature. Eden, Full Circle, p. 160. 
SO. The reasons for doubting the validity of the Final Decla­
ration are spelled out in Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition 
and the Question of Reunification,r" pp. 315-318. 
51. Ibid.r, p. 268. 
52. Text of the treaty is in ibid. , p. 452. A treaty asso­
ciating Vietnam with the French Union also was initialed 
on the same date. 
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the State of Vietnam as a " fully independent and sovereign
State." It also sti_pulated that the State of Vietnam would 
assume all rights and obligations concluded by France with 
respect to Vietnam. The treaty of independence was to take 
effect on the date of signature. On 4 June the treaty was 
initialed, but not signedr the treaty was not to be signed
until supplementary accords concerning the Juridical, mili­
tary, economic, and cultural relations had been comp·leted. 53 
Premier Laniel stated that in putting his initials to the 
treaty, he intended publicly to demonstrate "the intention of 
the Government of France to complete the granting of Viet­
namese independence."54 There was no suggestion that 
the State of Vietnam already was independent. Thus on 14 
July it was reported that the US was urging the establishment 
of a �ully independent Vietnamese government.55 On 23 July, 
after the signing of the Geneva Agreements, Secretary Dulles 
announced that Mendes-France had directed the completion of 
"_precise projects for the transfers of authority which will 
give reality to the independence which France has promised.t11 56 
It is clear that
.
at the time of Geneva, independence was but 
a promise, not a reality, for the State of Vietnam. There 
was thus good reason for the Geneva Conference's assumption
that France, not the State of Vietnam, was the competent 
authority in the area. 
In view of France's "promise" of independence, there was 
some prospect that the Saigon government might in fact become 
sovereign within the two-year period before the fulfi_llment 
of the Geneva Agreements. The Agreements took this into 
53. New York Times, 5 June 1954. The treaty seems never to 
have been signed. The absence of any report that the 
treaty was ever signed is noted in Coral Bell, Survey of 
International Affairs, 1954 (Londons Oxford University
Press under the auspices of Royal Institute of Interna­
tional Affairs, 1957), p. 85. On 16 September 1954 
France handed over "most of her remaining civil powers"
in Vietnam. Gen. Paul Ely, described as France's "civil 
and military chief in Indochina,t" then relinquished con­
trol of the police, Justice, and security departments as 
·well as public utili ties. New York Times, 17 September
1954. France held control of the State of Vietnam's de­
fense, monetary, and tariff policies until 1955. 
54. New York Times, 5 June 1954. 
55. New York Times, 14 July 1954. 
56. See Allan B. Cole (ed.), Conflict in Inda-China and 
International Re ercussions, A Documentar Histo , 
1945-1955 Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), 
p. 177. 
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58. 
account. Article 27 provided that 11 the signatories and their 
successors in their functionsr11 57 were bound to fulfill the 
obligations undertaken at Geneva. Inasmuch as the 4 June 
treaty between France and the State of Vietnam had explicitly 
stipulated that u_pon acquisition of independence the Saigon 
government would assume all rights and obligations undertaken 
by France with respect to Vietnam, there seemed to be no 
question that the State of Vietnam would be bound by the 
Agreements in the event of a French withdrawal. Thus, what­
ever legal objections have been raised since, it is clear 
that the understanding at Geneva was that elections would un­
conditionally be held by 1956, and that in the south France, 
or her successor, would be responsible for administration 
until the elections were held and hence, by implication, for 
assuring that the elections were in fact held. 
It is imp:>rtant to emphasize that the basic underlying
fact about the circumstances in which the election provision 
was ado_pted was the expectation that the Viet Minh would win 
the election. There was virtually no doubt that Ho Chi Minh 
would have been the overwhelming victor of a free election 
held at or shortly after the time of the Geneva Conference.SB 
Even in areas controlled by the State of Vietnam, a combina­
tion of nationalism, hatred of the French, and the ''appeal of 
Ho's propaganda'' was expected to be decisive.r59 Eisenhower 
has acknowledged that he did not know a single person knowl­
edgeable about the situation in Vietnam who denied that Ho 
Chi Minh might well have won 80% of the votes in an election 
57. It is noteworthy that this provision refers to successors 
in their functions, which suggests that the Agreement is 
speaking of de facto realities, not political formalities. 
AP correspondrent William L. Ryan estimated that Ho would 
get 75% of the vote if elections were held immediately.
New York Times, 23 April 1954. Thomas J .  Hamilton re­
ported in the New York Times, 4 July 1954, that experts 
on Indochina agreed that Ho would win any election held 
within a year. The French were reported as believing
that if the elections were delayed for over a year, the 
results might be "less one-sided.r" New York Times, 24 
June 1954. Even with a delay of two years, however, the 
Viet Minh was considered likely to win the elections. 
See the report by Hamilton in New York Times, 25 July
1954. 
59. The New York Times, 23 April 1954. Philippe Devillers 
estimates that Ho would have won 80% of the votes in the 
south in an election held in 1954. Lecture, Cornell 
University, 13 December 1965. 
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held in 1954.r
60 This, of course, explains the DRV's eager­
ness for early elections and its willingness to relinquish
territory in exchange for the promise of elections. Similar­
ly, it explains the State of Vietnam•s unwillingness to agree 
to the setting of a date for elections. 
The State of Vietnam's recognition of its weak position
in a political contest also helps explain an interesting
_paradox. The Bao Dai state's re_presentatives had been ada­
mant in asserting that Vietnam must not be divided into two 
states, and yet they insisted on regarding the Geneva settle­
ment as such a partition.r6 1 Neither the Geneva Agreements'
explicit statement that the demarcation line in no way con­
stituted a _political boundary, the French government's pledge
to support the territorial integrity of Vietnam,r62 nor the 
DRV's vehement insistence on the integrity of Vietnam and its 
denial that partition had occurred63 could convince Saigon
that the country was still a political unity. It seems 
strange that the government which had most strongly defended 
60. Dwight D. �M�a�n _d_a_t e _f�o _r_rC---h_a_n_g�e ;_Th_e___,;WhEisenhower, __ __ __ ..;...;.�i_t.;..e
House Years, 1953-1956 {New York: Signet Edition, 1965), 
p. 449. 
6 1. For example, see the statement of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van 
Hinh, broadcast over Radio Saigon, Vietnam Home Service, 
23 July 1954. Tran Van Do, the State of Vietnam foreign
minister, previously had insisted that the plan being 
worked out by the conference would amount to partition.
New York Times, 19 July 1954. 
62. In Cmnd. 2834. 
63. See, for example, Pham Van Dong's statement to the final 
session of the Geneva Conference, broadcast over Radio 
Moscow, 22 July 1954r Vo Nguyen Giap•s order of the day 
asserting that the military division was only temporary, 
New York Times, 26 July 1954r and Ho Chi Minh's state­
ment of 22 July 1954 broadcast over Radio Peking. As 
Ho put it: "The demarcation of the military zones • •• 
is just a provisional measure to be taken to restore the 
peace and ·realize the reunification of the nation by 
means of general elections. The demarcation line does 
not mean the political and territorial borderr.line. 
North, Central and South Vietnam are unseparable parts 
of our nation's territory.r" Perhaps the best statement 
is this one: "Our compatriots should not be deceived by
the lying propaganda of the American imperialists and 
the French warmongers and should not think that the 
zonal readjustment implies a 'division of the country.
Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 5 August 1954. 
111 
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Vietnam's integrity should be the one to declare that parti­
tion had in fact occurred. But it is not so odd that the 
State of Vietnam, ardent supporter of Vietnam's integrity, was 
in fact prepared to sacrifice that unity to build the basis 
for a legal justification for its own survival. Though it of 
course blamed the destruction of Vietnam's integrity on the 
Viet Minh's 11 sell-outr11 to Chinese and Soviet pressure,r64 the 
Saigon government itself, by its insistence that the country 
had been divided and its failure to recognize the provision 
for reunification elections, laid the framework for its later 
effort to foster the notion that the 17th parallel was a po­
litical boundary. For the State of Vietnam, the risk of elec­
tions was too high a price to pay for Vietnam's unity. 
Another norteworthy aspect of the circumstances in which 
the agreement to hold elections was reached was the DRVr1 s re­
jection of the us and State of Vietnam p:>sition that free 
elections could be assured only if supervised by the UN. From 
the start, the US had felt that the Geneva Conference should 
leave the working out of any political settlement to the UN .
General Assembly.65 Dong declared his adamant opposition to 
any UN role in the supervision of the truce (not to mention 
placing the entire question of a political settlement in the 
General Assemblyr1 s hands). He questioned the competence of a 
body that had refused to admit a nation of 500 million per­
sons.r66 Chou ended any thought of turning to the UN with a 
pointed remark that any attempt to bring the UN in would 
wreck the Geneva Conference.67 
If the us may have been skeptical about the objectivity 
of a three-member commission including Communist Poland and 
an India whose neutrality was suspected of being 11communist­
leaning,r11 it should be understood that the DRV had at least 
as much reason to be wary of the UN. Though the US would 
portray the UN as an obviously impartial body, it did not 
a_ppear so to the Viet Minh. In the early years of the UN,
the US had shown a remarkable ability to win its way, except
where a Soviet veto was operative, and even there the US had .
found a way out by reinterpreting the charter so as to enlarge 
64. According to Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, the Viet Minh 
used the Vietnamese revolution as "merchandise in trade" 
to please their Soviet and Chinese 11 masters.r11 Radio 
Saigon, Vietnam Home Service, 23 July 1954. 
65. See New York Times, 24 May 1954 and 26 May 1954. Britain 
and France gave no support to this proposal. New York 
Times, 9 June 1954. 
66. New York Times, 3 June 1954. 
67. New York Times, 4 June 1954. 
7 1 .  
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the functions of the General Assembly, where US dominance was 
as yet completely unchallenged. While it would be inappro­
_priate here to become involved in a discussion of the Uniting
for Peace resolutionr' s  legal merits or of the implications of 
the US's ability to exclude Communist China from the organi­
zation, it can at least be seen that the DRV might have had 
reasonable qualms about entrusting its fate to representatives
of an organization which had _proved so amenable to US desiresr. 
Perha_ps the best evidence that the DRV' s doubts about the UN 
were well-founded came in 1957, when the General Assembly
voted, 40-8 (with 18 abstentions), to admit South Vietnam to 
the UN. 68 The DRV, on the other hand, was rejected, with the 
US ex.pressing doubt that the DRV met the definition of a 
state because of its subordination to Moscow and Peking.r69 
To sum u_p, it is important to understand that from the 
start it was the DRV that urged free elections as the basis 
for a political settlement of the Vietnamese war. Though its 
willingness to acce_pt such terms unquestionably was based on 
its confidence of winning, that does not alter the fact that 
it did accept elections as the appropriate way to press its 
claim to be the legitimate government of all Vietnamr. More­
over, the concessions made by the DRV in exchange for the 
promise of elections suggest the overwhelming importance the 
Viet Minh attached to the elections as the key to the final 
achievement of the national goals for which it had spent
eight years fighting.r7 0  Nhan Dan clearly was confident7 1  the 
elections would be held: 
68 . New York Times, 1 March 1957 . The USSR vetoed the pro­
_posal in the Security Councilr. 
69 .  New York Times, 31 January 1957 . 
70 . Numerous other analyses attest to the extent to which 
the DRV relied on elections. For example, Robert 
Scigliano, in South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Bos­
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p .  133, has written: 
"The Viet Minh had set heavy store by these elections • • • •  " 
The Economist, 16 July 1955, asserts: "The Geneva Agree­
ment was regarded by the Chinese and the Viet Minh as an 
unavoidable device to save French face, and they took it 
for granted that it merely entailed a delay of two years
before the Viet Minh would take over the other half of 
the country, thus gathering the full harvest of their 
military victory."  
There are, to be sure, those who argue that the DRV 
never e�pected the elections to be held. P .  J .  Honey,
in Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: M . I . T .  Press, 
1963), p .  6 ,  reports that Dong told a Vietnamese friend 
of Honeyr' s  at Geneva that he did not really think the 
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72. 
The French government has recognized the independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the 
three states in Indochina • • • •  The final declaration of 
the Geneva Conference has stipulated the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Indochina and • • •  general elections 
in each country of Indochina • • • •  The above-mentioned 
recognition and stipulation, on the one hand, guarantee
the consolidation of our basic victories, and on the 
other, create favorable conditions for us to overcome all 
difficulties and go forward to settle peacefully the 
question of complete national unity and independence.r72 
Perhaps the most forceful statement of the DRV's expectation
and determination that the country would be reunified by elec­
tions in 1956 was Dongr's speech to the final meeting of the 
Geneva Conference : 
A big step has been made. It remains to take other 
steps. We will have to reestablish lasting and durable 
_peace in Indochina by a settlement of political issues,
first among wh ich is the accomplishment of the national 
unity of our people through elections • • • •  
The conference has set the date for our unity. We 
shall achieve this unity, we shall achieve it just as we 
have won the war. No force in the world, internal or 
external, can make us deviate from our path to unity 
through peace and democracy. This will be the consummation 
elections "WOuld take _place. Even if such a view were 
accurate, it would not necessarily signify that the DRV 
thought the elections would be sabotaged. Dong may
simply have felt that the Bao Dai regime, already very
weak, would colla_pse under the iID:pract of a Geneva settle­
ment which, if carried out, would almost certainly have 
meant the regimer' s  demise. There is, nevertheless, a 
_possibility that Dong anticipated that the us would back 
the State of Vietnam in defiance of the electoral pro­
vision. Nhan Dan found on 25 July that it was already
"evident that the enemies of peace, first • • •  the Ameri­
can im_perialists • • •  [ would ] entice the puppets to find 
every _possible means to sabotage the implementation of 
the armistice agreements.r" (See Vietnam News Agency dis­
_patch, 25 July 1954. ) But it is important to remember 
that what proved to be the essential condition for .rthe 
thwarting of the elections, na mely the emergence of a 
stable government in the south with full us backing, was 
foreseen by almost no one in July 1954. The confident 
tone of the rest of the Nhan Dan article strongly sug­
gests that the DRV considered its Geneva victory a real 
one. 
Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 25 July 1954. 
19 
of our national independence • • • • 
Long live peace� 
Long live the unity of our country� 73 
73. Radio Moscow, 22 July 1954. 
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III. WERE ELECTIONS EVER REALLY POSSIBLE? 
In view of the State of Vietnam's obvious disinclination 
to permit the sort of free elections envisaged by the Geneva 
Agreements, it is reas onable to ask whether elections were 
ever really possible. The answer is that the opinions of the 
State of Vietnam government did not seem to matter at the 
time, because, as was recognized in the Geneva Agreements, 
the competent authority of the zone south of the 17th parallel 
was the French army, not the Vietnamese regime. No doubt 
exis ted about France's responsibility for insuring the imple­
mentation of the Geneva Agreements in the south. 74 There was 
no reason for the Viet Minh leaders to think that France would 
renege on her obligations. In the days following the Geneva 
Conference, France-Asie pointedly urged the State of Vietnam 
regime to start preparing for the elections by carrying out 
reforms and seeking to counter Viet Minh propaganda. " The 
cease-fire is not final. It is but a means to solve the dead­
lock, " the article asserted. Referring to those who main-
tained that the e lections set for 1956 were "a bitter joke, " 
France-Asie argued that such ideas would "get Vietnam nowhere. 11 75 
Mendes-France stated publicly that he felt the elections could 
be won by the south, if needed reforms were undertaken. 76 
That the DRV was relying on France should be clear from Dong's 
74. See, for example,  the statements of French cabinet min­
isters before the Chamber of Deputies, recorded by Roger 
Pinto in " La France et les Accords d'Indochine devant 
les Accords de Geneve, •• Revue Francais e de Science Poli­
tigue, v, no. 1 (January-March, 1955), cited in George 
McT. Kahin and John w. Lewis, " The United States in Viet­
nam, " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XXI, no. 6 
( June, 1965), 3 1. 
75. Radio Saigon, 28 July 1954. 
76. Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the Question of Re­
unification,'' p. 280c It had been reported earlier that 
the French believed a two-year interval would offer "a 
good chance" of preve nting a Communist victory, provided
that a viable Vietnamese government could be established 
and considerable us economic aid were forthcoming. New 
York Times, 19 July 1954. Talk of the south's winning 
the election undoubtedly did not worry the DRV. As 
Philippe Devillers points out in ''The Struggle for the 
Unification of Vietnam, " The China Quarterly, 9 ( January­
March 1962), 3, the "almost derisory weakness " of the 
southern regime was such that the "majority of Western 
observers had undoubtedly few illusions about the non­
1 11Marxists • chances of • recovery. 
2 1  
statement on 1 January 1955: " It was with you, the French,
that we signed th e Geneva Agreements, and it is up to you to 
see that they are res_pected. 11  77 
It is im_portant to remember that al though it had reserved 
"freedom of action" and condemned France's having committed 
the south to elections without its consent, the State of 
Vietnam government did not ex_plicitly state that it would 
refuse to participate in the elections. It is true that many 
Vietnamese and "other observers" had " little confidencer11 that 
it would actually prove _possible to hold reunification elec­
tions any more than it hadr· _proven _possible in Korea or Ger­
many. 78 But there was in those doubts, as expressed at the 
time, the implication that somehow the Communists would refuse 
to let the elections take place, simply because they had never 
_permitted such elections in other countries. 79 It was not at 
all clear that the State of Vietnam would refuse to partici­
pate in the elections. In fact, there were even some promi­
nent leaders of the State of Vietnam--most notably two former 
premiers, Tran Van Huu and Nguyen Van Tam--who accepted the 
Geneva Agreements and urged that the elections be seen as a 
challenge to which the Saigon government should respond with 
positive measures to win _po_pular su_p_port. Given the unstable 
situation in the south, it did not seem out of the question
that such leaders as those might be back in _power when the 
time came for elections. 
Even if the State of Vietnam were to attempt to contra­
vene the Geneva Agreements, it was not certain that such an 
effort would be any more successful than its original attempt 
to block the accords at Geneva. After all, seven of the nine 
participants at Geneva had pledged their support to the agree­
ments. The seven had even prevailed over US objections at 
Geneva 1 might they not do so again, if need be? Although the 
us revived talk of a collective defense arrangement almost 
immediately after the Geneva Confrerence,r80 it remained 
77. Devi llers, 11 Struggle, 11 8. 
78. New York Times, 24 July 1954. 
79. B. s .  N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Pub­
lishing House, 1964), p. 179, suggests that the West 
must have felt that neither Moscow nor Peking could 
allow free elections in Vietnam because of the precedent
it would set for Korea and Germany. There may also have 
been, Murti believes, a sus_picion that the DRV govern..., 
ment courld not afford to let the results of free elec­
tions in the area they controlled reveal even the slight­
est o_p_posi tion to its rule. 
80. See the speech by Secretary Dulles on 2 3  July 1954, in 
Cole (ed.r) ,  Conflict, pp. 176-177. 
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committed by it s unilateral declaration to the view that 
"peoples are entitled to determine their own future,  " and it 
asserted that nothing in its declaration should be taken to 
indicate a de_parture from that _position. The US pledged not 
only to refrain from the use or threat of force to upset the 
agreements �  it also promised that it " would not join in any 
arrangement which would hinder" self-determination in Vietnam 
(nowhere does it refer to a "South Vietnam" ) .8 1 
Besides,  there were some voices in the US which greeted 
the _prospect of elections with favor. The New Yor.k Times saw 
the agreement on nat ion-wide elections under neutral supervi­
sion to determine Vietnam ' s  " final fate" as perhaps the "one 
saving grace" in the accords. The Times asserted that elec­
tions would have 11 a better chance of realization" in Vietnam 
than in Korea or Germany because the Communists hoped to win 
the Vietnamese elections.8 2  That the Times believed the pro­
spect of elections should be taken seriously was c lear from 
this editorial warning: 
If the Communists live up to the agreements reached 
there will be a free and supervised election in Vietnam 
two years hence. We cannot assume, with any certainty, 
that the Communists will permit such a free election. 
Conversely, we dare not assume that it will not take 
place. These two years must be used, in Vietnam, in in­
tensive preparation for such an election.83 
Others stressed the urgency of extending social and economic 
aid to the State of Vietnam so that it might win the election.84 
8 1. A good indication that the US did not recognize the 
existence of two states in Vietnam was the US announce­
ment in September 1954 that the US consulate in Hanoi 
would remain open after the Viet Minh took the city. The 
US s _pecifically cited paragraph 6 of the Geneva Confer­
ence Final Declaration which stated that the military
demarcation line did not represent a _political boundary. 
Murti, Vietnam Divided, pp. 173-174. Also, President 
Eisenhower , in his 23 October 1954 letter to Diem offer­
ing to discuss . an aid program, refers to Vietnam as "a 
country temporarily divided by an artificial military 
grouping. "  The letter is in u . s .  Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations ,  Background Information Relating to 
Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1965 )  , p. 67. 
82. New York Times,  20 July 1954. 
83. New York Times, 25 July 1954. 
84. See, for example, the speech by Rep. Franklin D. Roose­
vel t ,  Jr . ,  New York Times,  2 5 July 1954. 
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And in its daily coverage the Times wrote of the elections as 
if they were e�pected to take place in 1956. The Viet Minh 
leaders clearly were not without reason to think that the 
elections would be held as scheduled. 
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IV. WHY WERE ELECTIONS NOT HELD? 
The statements of the DRV in the period following the 
Geneva Conference provide evidence that the Viet Minh regime
did in fact contemplate the unifitcation of the country under 
their control by means of elections. Dongt' s  statement to the 
final meeting of the Geneva Conference stresses the importance 
of peace almost as much as the need for nattional unity.tBS 
Hot' s  statement of 22 July 1954 similarly placed emphasis not 
only on the indivisibility of Vietnam but also on the struggle
for peace and democracy, specifically elections. 86 Nhan Dan 
reported the Viet Minh line: " Henceforward, the main task of 
our struggle is to consolidate the peace we have won, faith­
fully and rapidly im_plernent the provisions of the armistice 
agreement, and go forward to the settlement of political 
issues. "t87 As the Viet Minh radio put it on 5 August 1954: 
"The _phase of armed struggle is now being replaced by the 
_phase of political struggle. 11 Exhorting the southern com­
patriots, the Viet Minh radio warned against the use of vio­
lence: "The political struggle requires the people in South 
Vietnam to maintain a high vigilance. It demands that our 
peo_ple avoid every provocation and use peaceful measures to 
win demotcratic freedom and ••• attainment of general elections 
to unify our country.t•• 88 
Throughout 1954 and into 1955, the utterances of the DRV 
leaders contitnued to reflect a policy based on political
struggle leading to the 1956 elections. Ho Chi Minh, in a 
November interview, was asked whether he feared that the divi­
sion of Vietnam could be as lasting as the partition of Korea 
and Germany. Ho replied negatively, pointing out that the 
" condtitions in Vietnam are different from those in Korea and 
Germany.t" He repledged the DRV to work 11 untiringlyt11 for 
peaceful reuntification as provided in the Geneva Agreements. 89 
In June 1955 Ho again stressed that Vietnam could not be com­
pared w ith Korea and Germany and instisted that the military 
demarcation and _provisional division could endure only until 
the 1956 elections were held. "Vietnam is a single country 
85. Radio Moscow, 22 July 1954. See also Dongt' s  statement 
broadcast over Radio Peking, 2 August 1954. 
86. New York Times, 26 July 1954, and Facts and Dates on the 
Problem of the Reuntification of Viet-Nam (Hanoi: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 10. 
87. Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 25 July 1954. 
88. Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 28 September 1954. 
89. Vietnam New Agency dispatch, 10 November 1954. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
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and nothing can prevent the firm will of its people from 
achieving its unity,t" he added.t90 Perhaps the most convincing 
statemetnts of the DRVt' s  expectation that the country would 
indeed be reunified by elections in 1956 were those made to 
their supp-ort ers. Viet Minh troops native of south Vietnam 
who were regrouped in the north were told that they would be 
returning home in 1956 after the elections.t91 And as the 
Viet Minh forces left areas they had ruled for many years, 
they advised the inhabitants to accept life under the State 
of Vietnam government until the Viet Minh could return after 
the reunification elections.t92 
If the DRV's statements revealed a confident expectation
and a strong determination that the country would be reunified 
by elections, the Viet Minh demonstrated those attitudes by 
more than mere words. The best evidence that the DRV took the 
Geneva Agreements 1 _promise of elections seriously is the be­
havior of the Viet Minh during the ensui.ng two years.93 As 
Roy Jumper, writing in late 1956, put it: "The Viet Minh 
agents have lain low during the past two years in South Viet­
nam. They waited expecting to win the South through the 
expected all ...... Vietnam elections.t11 94 Ho Chi Minht1 s followers 
largely refrained from any effort to retain a military hold 
on southern areas they had controlled for as long as ten years.
The DRV 1 s cooperation in the implementation of the Geneva 
Agreements probably came as a surprise to some.95 It is hard 
9 0. New York Times, 8 June 1955. 
91. Philippe Devillers, lecture, Cornell University, 13 
December 1965. See also Hot' s  letter to troops coming
north. Broadcast over the Viet Minh radio on 17 Septem­
ber 1954, Hot' s  letter said that although the troops re­
grouping in the north were "temporarily far" from their 
native villages, they could expect to "return happilyt" 
after the countryt' s  peaceful unification. 
Reported by Tillman Durdin, New York Times, 19 May 1955. 
Additional statements of the DRVt1 s reliance on peaceful 
struggle may be found in New China News Agency dispattch _of 21 September 1954, Vietnam News Age.ncy dispatches 
of 5 November 1954 and 28 March 1955, and Voice of Nambo 
broadcast of a Nhan Dan editorial on 23 September 1954. 
See Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New
Yorks Random House, 1966), p. 52. 
Roy Jumper, "The Communist Challenge to South Vietnam,t" 
Far Eastern Survey, XXV, no. 11 (November, 1956), 161. 
For example, some diplomats had doubted that any con­
siderable movement of refugees out of Communist areas 
26 
to imagine that its withdrawal from areas it had long con­
trolled meant only that the Viet Minh had become resigned to 
permanent partition. To suppose that is to ignore, among
other things, the force of the Viet Minhr' s  commitment to na­
tional unity. The Viet Minh forces had fought too long and 
hard for national unity under their leadership for them to 
give up what they had won without actually believing they 
could regain it. The DRV's actual relinquishing of territory 
and its abandonment of violence must be regarded as solid 
evidence that th= Viet Minh hoped to unify the country peace­
fully. 
The Viet Minh waged an extensive campaign to win votes 
in the election. In late September 1954 it was reported that 
"rpolitically" the Viet Minh was "working hard in the South to 
consolidate its influence.r" Political workers 11intensified 
their activity" as Viet Minh military forces withdrew, and 
the Viet Minh was "plainly pre.paring to win the national elec­
tions scheduled • • •  for 1956.r11 96  During the last three months 
of 1954, a congress of the Lien Viet {United National Front)
met in Hanoi. A Viet Minh-dominated organization, the Lien 
Viet included representatives of various political parties 
from northern, central, and southern Vietnam. According to 
Nhan Dan, the aim of the congress was to mobilize popular
forces in the struggle for "independence, peace and unity and 
dernocracy.r11 The Lien Viet's 11 work for 1955r11 was said to con­
sist "in winning support in all levels of the population with 
a view to winning the general elections for a united Vietnam.r11 97 
In late December the DRV added four leaders from south Viet­
nam to its cabinet in what was described in the press as a 
move undertaken because of its expected impact on " the psy­
chological warfarer" south of the 17th parallel in preparation 
for the 1956 electirons.r98 In March of 1955, it was reported
by c.  L. Sulzberger of the New York Times that Viet Minh agents 
were already going through villages in the south "lining up
votes." Their procedure was to take along two photographs, 
one of Ho Chi Minh and one of Bao Dai, and to ask the peasants 
would be permitted. New York Times, 24 July 1954. · Simi­
larly, Joseph and Stewart Alsop had doubted that the Viet 
Minh troops would voluntarily relinquish control of the 
areas they held. As the Alsop brothers put it : "Who 
can suppose that they [ the Viet Minh ] will peacefully
march away, abandoning the territory they now hold?" 
New York Herald-Tribune, 23 July 1954. 
96. Tillman Durdin in the New York Times, 29 September 1954. 
97. New York Times, 13 January 1955. 
98. New York Times, 31  December 1954. 
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whom they preferred. In June 1955 there were reports that 
the Viet Minh was working hard to prepare for elections and 
had opened an intensive new campaign to woo the workers and 
peasants of the south. Communists had reportedly secured 
positions in athletic organizations, ancestor worship cults, 
workingmen'ts groups and other associations in an effort to 
win support for the Viet Minh not only C?n the basis of Ho's 
prestige as a nationalist leader but also through promises of 
the economic adva.ntages communtism allegedly would bring to 
the south.t1 0 0  Meetings, demonstrations and the simple process 
of making known the provisions of the Geneva Agreements (con­
sidered a subversive activity in the south) were also· part of 
the Viet Minh campaign to win the electio�s.t1 0 1  
Still another type of action taken by the DRV to promote
Vietnam' s peaceful reunification was Hanoi' s proposal on 4 
February 1955 that "normal relations" be established between 
the two zones. The Communists declared their willingness to 
grant all faciltities to persons on both sides of the border 
in sending mail, carrying out business enterprises, and 
facilitating exchanges of a cultural, scientific, sporting, 
and social nature.t102 
Anticipating the approach of the 20 July 1955 deadline 
set at Geneva for the consultations on elections, the DRV 
leaders began to press specifically to ensure the holding of 
those meetings. In Apr il Dong visited New Delhi and issued 
a joint statement with Nehru reaffirming the importance at­
tached by the two governments to the holding of reunitfication 
elections under tre procedure laid down at Geneva.t103 On 
6 June Dong declared his government • s  readiness to begin the 
consultattions scheduled for the following month. Dong went 
on to warn: "Vietnam is one. The Vietnamese nation ist.tone. 
No force can divide them. Whoever tries to partition Viet­
nam is the enemy of the Vietnamese people and will surely be 
99t. New York T imes, 13 March 1955. 
100 . New York Times, 2 June 1955 and 8 June 1955t. 
1 0 1 . Murti, Vietn.am Divided, p. 157. The extent to which such 
demonstrations can be regarded as Viet Minh activities 
is uncertain, but in at least one case the demonstrators 
were reported to 
Hanoi. New York 
be acting on the exhortattions 
Times, 4 July 1955. 
of Radio 
1 02. See 
ary 
Facts and 
1955. 
Dates, p. 18, and New York Times, 7 Febru­
1 03. Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China 
(London: Oxford University Press, l96l), p. 370. 
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defeated. "  In July Ho went to Peking and Moscow seeking
both economic aid and support for the holding of the consulta­
tive conference. His visits produced joint communiques stress­
ing the importance of starting the consultative meetings on 
time.r105 On 19 July Premier Dong, on behalf of himself and 
President Ho, sent to President Diem a letter formally pro­
posing that Diem appoint representatives to attend a consul­
tative conference to discuss reunification elections as pro­
vided in the Geneva Agreements.r106 
Duri.ng the preceding year, the Diem government had made 
no effort to hide its contempt for the Geneva Agreements, but 
it had not actually enunciated an official policy with regard
to its participation in the consultative conferencer. Although 
at the start of 1955 the US was still talking about new mea­
sures to win the 1956 elections,r1 07 doubts about the possibil­
ity of holding the election were apparent, particularly in 
dispatches emanating from Saigon. On 28 February Radio Saigon 
suggested that the elections would not be held because of the 
absence of denocratic liberties in the north. On. 15 March 
Secretary Dulles argued that it 'WOuld be hard to create the 
conditions for a free choice in the north.r1 08 By March 1955 
it was becoming quite clear that the Diem regime 'WOuld prob­
ably try to avoid the elections. As Sulzberger put it, the 
1956 elections "really will never be held • • • •  Nobody likes to 
talk about thisr. But when the time to admit it arrives, a 
grave crisis must inevitably develop.r11 109 At the end of March 
it was reported that observers in Saigon were expressing " open 
doubtr" that such elections ever would be held.r110 In mid-May 
the State of Vietnam government, in notes sent to Britain, 
France and the us, urged a conference to formulate a common 
position on the elections in light of the probability, as seen 
104. 
105r. 
106.  
107r. 
New York Times, 7 June 1955r. See also For the Consulta­
tive Conference (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1955). 
Facts and Dates,- pp. 24-25r. 
Ibid. ,  p .  26. 
See, for exampl·e, the article in New York Times, 8 Janu­
ary 1955, reporting US hopes that a land reform program
could "tip the scales in favor of the West" in the 1956 
elections. 
108. 
1 09 .  
The Saigon broadcast and Dullesr1 
in Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 
New York Times, 12 March 1955.  
speech are both reported 
15 March 1955. 
1 10. New York Times, 30 March 1955 . 
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in Saigon, that they would not be held.t111 on 9 June, three 
days after Dongt• s  announcement that the DRV was ready for 
consultations, Saigon'ts view reportedly was that any comment 
on the DRV statement should come from France. The south, it 
was asserted, had no intention of acting on the matter.t112 
Despite the flow of reports describing Saigon'ts unwill­
ingness to partici_pate in reunification elections, there was 
genuine uncertainty as to whether Diem would agree to take 
part in the consultative conference. France had been con­
sistent in urging the State of Vietnam government to prepare
for elections. In March 1955 Premier Edgar Faure urged Diem 
to cooperate with the sects in the hope of winning their 
support in the election.t113 Faure said in April that France 
was detennined above all to observe strictly the Geneva 
Agreements, and he insisted that there could be no question
of annulling or postponing the 1956 elections.t114 Fauret.
warned that there were two pitfalls before the Diem govern­
ment--one was losing the 1956 elections and the other was 
trying to avoid them.t115 On the completion of the withdrawals 
and transfers of military forces, representatives of the 
French High Comrna.nd and the Viet Minh army issued a joint 
statement resolving " to continue to assure their responsibil­
ity in the full implementation of the provisions of the 
Geneva Agreement and of the final declaration •••• " Both 
parties reaffirmed their detennination to "implement scrupu­
lously" the necessary provisions "in order to consolidate 
peace and to achieve the unity of Vietnam by means of general 
electiotns.t11 116 The British also felt strongly that Diem 
should observe fully the provisions of the Geneva Agreements.
On 13 July, Foreign Secretary Macmillan declared in Parlia­
ment that Britain 'WOuld exert all its influence to ensure the 
holding of consultations as provided in the Geneva Agree­
ments.t1 17 
111. New York Times, 2 0  May 1955. 
112t. New York Times, 9 June 1955. 
113t. Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the Question of 
Reunificatio.n, 11 pp. 3 63-364. 
114t. New York Times, 14 April 1955. 
115. New York Times, 4 May 1955. 
116. Quoted in Cole (ed. ), Conflict, p. 208. This statement 
was cited by Dong in his 6 Ju.ne declaration of the DRVt' s 
readiness for consultations. 
117. Facts and Dates, p. 24. See also Economist, 16 July
1955. 
3 0  
The official attitude of the US was ambiguous. It was 
generally believed by early 1955 that the US was not invest­
ing heavily in the buildup of the State of Vietnam merely to 
hand it over to the Viet Minh in elections. On 14 May, how­
ever, Faure was reported to have obtained Dullesr' assurance 
that the US "WOuld back France in seeking to prepare for the 
1956 elections.r118 In June Sulzberger reported that the "only 
solid fact" agreed on by the us, France, and Britain during
Mayr' s  Indochina negotiations in Paris was "that the Geneva 
pledge for all-Vietnam elections must be carried out.r" Wash­
ington reportedly was "of the same mind as Paris and London 
• • •  that every preparation must be made on the assurnptio.n 
elections will be held.r" Sulzberger explained that Dulles 
had secured reluctant British and French support for Diem, 
and "in exchange he concurred that the promised elections in 
Vietnam should faithfully be carried out.r" According to 
Sulzberger, Diemr' s  reported opposition to elections put him 
in disagreement with "the one point on which the Big Three 
unequivocally agree.r11 119 The Times now wrote editorially of 
the elections as if they really were expected to take place: 
The real deadline in Vietnam • • •  is July of next year,
when a definitive election is scheduled. That deadline 
must be met • • • •  The United States still expects an elec­
tion in all of Vietnam and would like to see that elec­
tion properly supervised. Moreover, it would like to see 
free Vietnam strong enough and stable enough that it 
-would offer a reasonable alternative to the Communist 
rule in the north. This is the reason for the present 
assistance and training program.r120 
Probably in response to growing pressures from the West­
ern powers, Diem began to move toward accepting elections. 
On 14 June he told a group of correspondents that his govern­
ment was willing to discuss the question of elections with the 
DRV. He did not elaborate that statement, except to say that 
"it all depends on the conditions under which elections are 
held.r" A source close to the premier said that the south 
would demand extensive third-party supervision and detailed 
procedures for insuring a secret ballot. He mentioned the 
grouping of military forces in concentration areas so theyr· 
could not exercise pressure during the elections as one of 
the conditions the State of Vietnam was considering. The 
source said that the results of any talks between the two re­
gimes would be submitted to the soon-to-be-elected National 
Assembly, which would have to decide whether the south would 
118. New York Times, 14 May, 1955. 
119. New York Times, 8 June 1955. 
120. The above quote is drawn from New York Times editorials 
of 20 May 1955 and 29 June 1955. See also New York Times,
26 May 1955. 
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actually participate in the elections. Tillman Durdin, who 
reported Diemr' s  remark and the 11 source ' s" amplifying comments,.
characterized it as the ''first definite indication that 
South Vietnam was likely to engage in discussions" with the 
DRV concerning procedures for elections.r121 
As the 20 July deadline neared, it was expected that 
Diem would make a statement, but its contents were kept 
secret.r122 The Economist wrote that Diem seemed likely to 
"keep everyone guessing until the last moment about whether 
he will send representatives to consultations" with the 
DRV. 123 On 16 July Diem made k.nown his position in a. radio 
broadcast to the nation. He stated that he favored free 
elections in principle but could not consider holding them 
until the DRV had given him proof of its readiness to place 
national interests before its Communist creedr. It is 11 out of 
the question,r" he asserted, "for us to consider any proposal
from the Vietminh, if proof is not given us that they put 
the superior interests of the national community above those 
of communism7 if they do not give up terrorism and totali­
tarian methods 7 if they do not cease violating their obliga­
tions • • • •  " Diem also reasserted that the State of Vietnam 
did not consider itself bound by the Geneva Agreements.r124 
The British responded on 18 July with a Foreign Office 
declaration expressing regret at Diemr's statement and urging
that consultations be started as soon as possible.r125 Diemr's 
attitude toward elections was discussed at the Paris confer­
ence of Western foreign ministers to prepare for the Geneva 
summit conference. The foreign ministers, fearing bitter re­
criminations from the USSR at Geneva, agreed to do their best 
to persuade Diem to change his mind.r126 Britain and France 
made an effort to convince Diem that the State of Vietnam ' s  
_position \41.10uld be a strong one if it could demonstrate with 
the support of the ICC that free elections were being blocked 
by the Viet Minhr's failure to permit adequate supervision. 
He was assured that the West and the ICC would back him fully
in trying to _preve.nt "Communist fraudulism or subversion 
121. New York Times, 15 June 1955. 
122. New York Times, 15 July 1955. 
1 23 . Economist, 16 July 1955. 
124. The text of Diemr' s  talk is in Republic of Vietnam, The.
Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam (Saigon: Ministry
of Informartion, 1958), pp. 30-31. 
125. New York Times, 19 July 1955. 
126 . Murti, Vietnam Divided, p .  184. 
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p. 
during the election _period. 11 Paris and London sought to 
clarify to Diem the difference between holding elections and 
simply taking part in the consultations, which was all that 
was required at the moment. They stressed that in talking
with the DRV, Diem would be making no irrevocable corranitments 
and would be giving evidence of his adherence to the Geneva 
Agreements.r127 At the Geneva surranit meeting, the three West­
ern leaders agreed to undertake added efforts to convince 
Diem to accept the DRV's invitation, but Eisenhower and Eden 
both stressed that their _power to move Diem was limi tea. On 
26 July a Western note was transmitted to Diem.r128 
The State of Vietnam, nevertheless, denied that the West­
ern powers had put any pressure on it to conform to the Geneva 
Agreements, and insisted that the Western note had actually 
been an ex_pression of sym_pathy with its _position. US State 
De_partment officials affirmed that the note had conveyed over­
all approval of Diem's position, but had urged that he at 
least 11go through the motionsr" of trying to organize free 
elections.r129 The British denied any implication that they
had given approval to Diem's refusal to talk with the DRv.r130 
But Western assurances could not alter Diemr's conviction that 
by entering talks with the DRV he would have committed himself 
to the electirons.r1 3 1  On 9 August Diem formally replied to 
Dong's note of 19 July. The State of Vietnam premier essen­
tially reiterated his _position of 16 July, insisting that 
"nothing constructive [ with respect to elections ] will be done 
as long as the Communist regime of the North does not permit
each Vietnamese citizen to enjoy democratic freedoms and the 
basic fundamental rights of man.r11 1 32 
The next day, in a press conference, Secretary Dulles 
asserted that Diem was correct in not feeling bound by the 
Geneva Agreement to hold reunifrication elections because his 
government had not signed the Agreement.r133  The British For­
eign Office, on the other hand, was reported "disturbed" by •.
127. Ibid. , 189. 
128. Ibid. , p. 185. 
129. New York Times,· 9 August 1955. 
130. New York Times, 10 August 1955. 
131.  New York Times, 23 July 1955. 
1 32. See Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the Question of 
Reunification,r" pp. 389-390. 
133. Ibid. , p. 390. See also Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 186. 
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the Diem statement. On 3 0 August Dulles gave Diem un-
equivocal support, statinga "We certainly a.gree that condi­
t ions are not ripe for free elections . 11 135 Thus the us, whose 
pa.rt icipation in the common Western effort to persuade Diem 
to talk with the DRV had always been unenthusiast ic,  1 3 6  now 
emerged in firm official support of his opposition to elec­
t ions. In view of the us • s  heavy economic aid to the State 
of Vietnam and its fervent back.ing of Diem in the face of 
British and French urgings that he be replaced, the importance 
to Diem of us backing for his e lection stand must have been 
considerable. Apparently encouraged by Dul les  ' strong sup­
port, Diem declared bluntly on 2 1  September that there could 
be " no question of a conference, even less of negotiations"  
with the DRv. 1 3 7 
It should be cl ear that despite the apparent unwill ing­
ness of the State of Vietnam to take any steps toward elec­
t ions, the DRV during the first year after Geneva had been 
making extensive preparations in anticipation of the elect ions 
and had had at least some reason to think that Diem might be 
forced into accepting them. Even after Diem '  s refusal to 
permit a consultative conference, the DRV still had cause to 
hope that the elections would be held. The continuing insta� 
bility of Diem ' s  position offered a possibility that more 
conci l iatory elements might accede to the leadership. And 
the DRV probably wa.s conscious of a considerable amount of 
internat ional support for its position that e ither the French 
134 .  See The Times ( London) ,  11  August 1955 . According to 
The Times, British officials were unhappy that Diem 
seemed " determined to go on f inding excuse s  for post­
poning election talks" with the Viet: Minh. The British 
had already taken pains to dissociate themselves from 
any expression of support for Diem such as that given by 
Dulle s .  See New York Times,  10 August 1955. 
1 3 5.  Quoted in Ngo Ton Dat,  11 Geneva Partition and the Question 
of Reunifi cation,  " p. 391.  
13 6 . Whereas Fra.nce and Britain had publicly called for con­
sultations, the us , at least prior to 22  July, had only 
expressed 11 unofficially 11 the 11 hope 11 that Diem would meet 
with t"tle Viet Minh. But the US had not formally suggested 
to Diem that he do so. New York Herald-Tribune, 2 2  July
1955 , cited in ib_id. , p. 380.  On 2 3 July, the New York 
Times accurately described the us positio.n as "obscure . 11 
The Times had already, on 2 1  July, altered its previous
l ine and given editorial support to Diem ' s  16 July stand : 
"We must not be trapped into a fictitious lega.lism that 
can condemn 10,  000,  000 potentially free persons into 
slavery • • • •  The agreements do not necessarily have to be 
abrogated but they should at least be scrutinized with 
the sharpest eye .  " 
13 7 .  Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 3 7 2 .  
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or the State of Vietnam, one or the other or both, should be 
held responsible for ensuring that the Geneva Agreements were 
implemented in the southern zone. Accordingly, the DRV con­
tinued its efforts to prepare for elections and to press for 
a consultative conference. Two approaches were employed: 
the intensification of propaganda work in the south and the 
appeal for international assistance. 
The principal step taken to intensify its campaign to 
rally ,po_pular support in the south for reunification elections 
was the formation in September 1955 of the Vietnam Fatherland 
Fro.nt, whi ch incorporated the Lien Viet. The platform of the 
Fatherland Front set forth in some detail the DRVt' s  under­
standing of how the peaceful reunification of Vietnam by elec­
tions should proceed. It called, in effect, for a sort of 
federation. Through "free, general electio.ns, organized on 
the principle of universa l ,  equal and secret ballot , t" a uni­
f ied national assembly was to be chosen. The assembly, which 
was to be the h ighest legislative body of the state, would 
elect a central coalition government. The platform emphati­
cally stated that it was necessary to take into account dif­
ferences between the two zones. Thus there was to be set up
in each zone a Peop le' s Counci l  and an admintistrative body
with wide powers. Those organs would have the right to pro­
mulgate local laws constistent with the characteristics of the 
zone concterned and not at variance with conmton national laws. 
Normal eco.nomic, cultural and social relations were to be 
inmtediately restored between the two zo.nes. The armed forces 
were to be integrated gradually and through negotiations. 
Agraria.n reform policies in the south were expected to differ 
from those in the northr in the former region the government
would "requisition-by-purchase" properties of landlords for 
distribut ion to the peasantry. The platform insist�d that 
there should be no attempt "by either side to annex or incor­
porate the other.t11 138 
The Fatherland Front platform was quickly made the pro­
gram of the DRV government. Dong, in a report to the Fifth 
Session of the National Assembly in September 1955, warmly em­
braced the platform as the "basis" and the 11 methodt11 by which 
national unity could be achieved. Dong declared that the 
Fatherland Front program opened up "a new stage ••• of complex
and diffticult political struggle • • •• " Plans to use the Father­
land Front program as the basis of an extensive campaign to 
rally support for the consultative confer�nce were also made 
clear. The program was to be given the most extensive dis­
semtination. All political parties, peoplet1 s organi zations, 
and "representative ,personatlities" in both zones were to 
establ ish contact and exchange ideas on the program so as to 
138. See Viet-Nam Fatherland Front (Hanoi a Foreign Languages·
Publtishing House, 1956), pp. 19-22. 
35 
create a nationwide movement demanding that the Southernt· 
authorities hold consultations on elections.t139 Broadcasting 
over Radio Hanoi and working through Viet Minh cadres who had 
stayed in the south, a. number of organized demonstrations were 
held to persua.de Diem to open consult
.
ations with the DRV. 140 . 
A good part of the DRV' s _pro_paganda effort was devoted 
to attacks on the October 1955 referendum and the March 1956 
constituent assembly elections held in the south. An effort 
was made to encourage the populace to boycott the elections. .
Strikes were staged, and demonstrations were held.t1 4 1  The 
DRV denounced the elections as a violationt. of the Geneva 
Agreements and a "farce , t" insisting that South Vietnam was 
not a country.t142 
Although the DRV may have had some confidence that strong
_popular support for the holding of electio.ns would compel the 
southetrn government to cooperate,t143 it is probable that Hanoi 
placed more hope in its appeals for international action to 
fortce Diem's compliance with the Geneva Agreements. The DRV 
looked to the co-chairmen, es_pecial ly the USSR, to put pres­
sure on Diem. Roughly a week after Diemt' s  9 August refusal 
to accept the DRVt' s  invitation to hold consultations, Dong 
sent a l etter to the co-chairmen reporting the situation and 
requesting that they take .. all necessary measures to ensure 
• • •  the immediate convening of the consultative conference • • • • " 
Despite France's disclaimer ,  in a June note to Hanoi and the 
ICC, of any responsibility for bringing the south into con­
sultations with the north,t1 44 Dong demanded that France and 
the State of Vietnam guarantee the implementation of the 
139. Ibid.t, pp. 1 1-12,  29 , 34-45. 
140. Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 196. 
141. See Facts and Dates, pp. 37, 38, 52, 54 , 55. 
142. Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 1 May 1956. 
143. Alex Josey, "Will Ho Chi Minh Unite Viet Nam?" Ea.stern 
World (Lo.ndon) ,  November 1955, p. 1 6, reports that the 
DRV leaders were confident that the desire of national­
ists in the south for unity would eventually force Diem 
to yield. Josey talked with Ho, Dong, and General Vo 
·Nguyen Giap, army chief of staff. 
144. New York Times, 21 June 1955. It was reported in the 
Economist, 16 July 1955, that the Viet Minh were in the 
ironic position of appealing to the French tot·tleave their 
troo_ps in Vietnam to ensure observance of the Geneva 
Agreements. 
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agreements.r
145 
Nehru also intervened at this point, express­
ing to Eden and Molotov the hope that they could induce Diem 
to cooperate.r146 In September Molotov gave the DRV weak sup­
port in a UN speech. He said he felt "entitled to expect"r. 
that steps would be taken to prevent a "breakdown" of the 
consul tations and cal led such steps "essential,. if the gen­
eral elections are to be held within the prescribed time 
limit • • • •  11 1 47 On 31 October Chou En-lai informed the co­
chairmen of his support for the DRV ' s  August letter.r148 In 
November 1955 Dong again approached Molotov withr� request
that the co-chairmen take action, and again the USSRr' s  re­
sponse was mild.r149 Molotov called on the French to inquire
about their position on elections and ex
B
ressed his concern 
about the State of Vietnam ' s  attitude.r15 He also met with 
British Foreign Secretary Macmillan at Geneva. The British,
who had stated in August that they did not believe the State 
of Vietnam could continue indefinitely to refuse consultations,15 1 
145.  Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 190. Dong ' s  letter to the 
co-chairmen (text in Cmndr. 2834) produced no resultsr. 
on 16 September the British Foreign Office announced 
that the USSR had handed over the DRV's letter to the 
co-chairmen to India. On 20 September Britain transmitted 
the letter to the other members of the Geneva Conference. 
Facts and Dates, pp. 34-35. 
146 .  Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 37 1. Again on 7 September
Nehru and Krishna Menon spoke in support of the DRV. 
Facts and Dates, p. 33. According to the New York Times,
27 August 1955, Nehru had already held that the State of 
Vietnam was bound as a " successor regime. "  In an aide­
memoire sent to the co-chairmen on 14 June 1955, India 
had called on Britain and the USSR to issue a request
that the DRV and the State of Vietnam begin consultations. 
The aide-memoire noted that the French had "transferredr. 
their sovereign authority" in the south subsequent to 
the signing of the Geneva Agreements. Thus, asserted 
the aide-memoire, the representative authorities to whom 
the election provision applied were the DRV and, " in 
virtue of Article 27 , the State of Vietnam which has 
taken over the civil administration in South Vietnam from 
the French authorities. "  Text of the aide-memoire is 
in Cmnd. 2834. 
147r. New York Times, 24 September 1955.  
148. Cmnd. 2834. 
149. Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 372. 
150. New York Times, 5 November 1955. 
151 . New York Times, 10 August 1955. 
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said that they still favored the electionsr. Macmillan re­
portedly told Molotov that chances for holding the elections 
might be better after the Saigon government elected its con­
stituent assembly.r152 On 20 December the co-chairmen reported
the delivery of the various messages they had received to the 
members of the Geneva Conference and said they would be 
"grateful" to receive comments and suggestions.r153 By the 
end of 1955, it is likely that the DRVr1 s hopes of obtaining 
action by a.ppealing to the co-chairmen had been grea.tly
diminished. 
At the end of January 1956 an innovation was introduced 
i.nto the DRVr' s campaign for international a.id in bringing
the Diem regime to discuss elections. In response to the co­
chairmen I s December request for suggestions, Chou En-la.i pro­
posed the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference, adding
the members of the Icc.r154 On 14 February 1956 the DRV also 
_prop0sed a new Geneva Conference in a note to the co-chair­
men� 155 A week later the Indian government wrote to the co­
chairmen to express its support of all initiatives a.imed at 
ensuring the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements. 156 on 18 
February the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the 
aritish embassy, supporting the proposals made. by China and 
the DRV and urging that the co-chairmen inform the conference 
members of their common belief that a new meeting was needed. 
The British reply on 9 March suggested that it would be pre­
mature to pro.-pose a full conference until the views of other 
countries had been clarified, but proposed that the co-chair­
men meet to discuss the situation. On 30 March the USSR re­
asserted its support for a new conference but also agreed to 
meet first with the British. The tone for the upcoming Anglo­
Soviet meeting was set by a British note sent to the USSR on 
152. New York Times, 15 November 1955 . This view, surprising
in light of the DRVr' s tendency to see such " se.paratist" 
elections as a major bar to reunification, was also ma.in­
tained by New York Times, 5 February 1956r. The probabl.e 
assum_ption was that a strengthened Saigo.n regime, hold­
ing a po_pular ma.ndate, might be in a stronger position
to negotiate with the north. 
153 .  Cmnd. 2834. 
154. New York Times, 3 1  January 1956. 
155 . Facts and Dates, p. 51.  
156. Ibid. , p .  52. Nehru strongly supported the DRV , stress­
ing that since Diem accepted the benefits of the Geneva 
Agreements, he should undertake the responsibilities. 
See ibid. , p .  53 . 
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9 April. Restating wndont• s  belief that the Diem government
should agree to consutltations but denying that it was legally 
bound to do so, the Brit ish note urged that the maintenance 
of peace be regarded as the "paramount objective.t" 
The meetings that were held in Apr il between the Soviets 
and the British _produced what must have been a disappointing 
result for the DRv.t157 The co-chairmen showed more concern 
about the maintenance of _peace in Vietnam than about the 
country's reunification in their message issued on 8 May. 
They expressed their concern about the situation and strongly 
urged the authortities of both Vietnamese governments to en­
sure the implementation of the political provisions adopted 
at Geneva. Both governments were: 
invited to transmit to the Co-Chairmen as soon as pos­
sible, either jointly or separately, their views about 
the time required for the o_pening of consultattions on 
the organi zation of nation-wide elections in Viet-Nam 
and the t ime requitred for the holding of elections as 
a means of achieving the unification of Viet-Nam. 
But the real concern of the co-chairmen was apparent in their 
statement that pending the holding of electtions they attached 
"great importance" to the maintenance of the cease-fire.t158 
The DRV responded first on 11 May 1956 by dispatching 
another letter to Diem, citing the co-chairmen's message and 
requesting the start of consultations, but also pledging to 
maintain peace.t159 On 4 June Dong replied to the co-chairmen.t· 
He repeated the DRV's readiness for immediate consultations 
and requested that the co-chairmen take the necessary steps 
to bring them about. He also declared that he would again
seek a new Geneva Conference if the southern goyernment
maintained its "negative att itude" toward consultations and 
157.  The letter was hailed as a triumph in the south. Ibid. , 
pp. 7 1-7 2. 
158 .  Texts of the various notes mentioned above are in Cmnd. 
2834. It has been noted by Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Parti­
tion and the Question of Reunification,t" pp. 404-405, 
that the Brit ish insistence that elections be held on 
t ime had declined after the start of- 1956. He attrtibutes 
this change to a " desire to achieve unity of policy"
with the us, an ap_preciation of the _progress made by
Diem in establishing order, and apprehension about the 
growth of DRV armed strength. 
159. Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 May 1956r also New 
York Times, 13 May 1956. 
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elections.r160 There was, of course, no question as to what 
Diemr' s  position would be. After winning his self-proclaimed 
referendum against Bao Dai the preceding October and declar­
ing a Republic of Vietnam, Diem insisted that he now had a 
,po,pular mandate not to proceed with unification elections.r161 
Diem even told a British correspondent in March that he did 
not want unification until the south had been strengthened
and ,popular disillusionment had weakened the .north.r162 One 
of the first acts of the newly-elected constituent assembly
in March was formally to denounce the Geneva Agreements.r163 
Thus, when on 29 May the Diem government answered the co­
chairmen's message, it simply reaffirmed its prior position 
that "the absence of all liberty in North Vietnam makes the 
question of electoral and pre-election campaigns practically
unattainable for the moment.r11 164 Diem received ardent sup­
port from the US in a speech delivered by Walterrs. Robertson,
Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, before the 
American Friends of Vietnam on 1 June. 165 The 20 July dead­
line for elections passed. 
Hanoir's willingness to let the 1956 deadline pass with­
out incident should not be taken as a sign that the DRVr's 
interest in reunification through elections had diminished. 
That Hanoi was still under heavy pressures to achieve reuni­
fication seems clear enough. The Viet Minh's strong commit­
ment to national unity through years of hard fighting against
the French has already been mentioned. Furthermore, North 
Vietnam, traditionally a food deficit area, could not hope
to lead a truly independent existence. Vietnam is an· eco­
nomic unityrr the two halves complement each other. Without 
access to southern rice, the DRV leaders faced the prospect
of an uncomfortable dependence on Chinese food supplies.r166 
160. Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the Question of Re­
unification,r" P.P• 410-41r1. 
16 1. New York Times, 26 October 1955. Bao Dai had denounced 
Diem's action in holding the referendum as one which 
would render reunification through na.tion-wide elections 
impossible. 
162. The Timesr·r( London ) ,  12 March 1956, cited in Murti, 
Vietnam Divided, p. 190. 
163. New York Times, 9 March 1956. 
164. Ngo Ton Dat ,  "Geneva Partition and the Question of Re­
unification,'  pp. 409-4r10. 
165. Ibid., p. 4 12. 
166. Possible evidence that the DRV leaders were unhappy at 
this prospect is available. In late 1954, the DRV 
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The DRV was under significant pressure as wel l  from Viet Minh 
troops from the south who had been regrouped in the north and 
told they would be returning to their homes after the 1956 
elections.167 A similar source of embarrassment was the 
group of Viet Minh cadres who had stayed behind in the 
south.t168 Cultural and social pressures for a normalization 
of relations with the south were also of some importance. 
There is good evidence that elections were still  the 
means by which Hanoi sought to accomplish reunification. 
Throughout the . year following Diem's refusal to hold consul­
tations, DRV leaders had continued to maintain in uncompro­
mising terms the paramountcy of the struggle for reunifica­
tion through elections. Dong had said in September 1955 that 
there cou ld be " no other alternative" than the holding of the 
elections as prescribed in the Geneva Accords.t169 In April 
1956 Truong Chinh reaffirmed the policy of working for national 
reunification through elections. Recognizing the difficulties 
encotunteredt, Truong Chinh noted that there were " some people
who do not believe in the correctness of this political pro­
gram and of the policy of peaceful reunification of the coun­
try, holding that these are illusory and reformist." But,· 
asserted Truong Chinh, the recent declarations of the Soviet 
Uniont' s  Twentieth Party Congress concerning the peaceful
transition to sociatlism had provided ''new reason to be 
reportedly delayed its aid negotiations with China 
several months in an effort to work out an arrangement
with France. Though an agreement was reached, French 
concer.ns and technicians proved unwilling to remain i.n 
the Communist zone. New York Times, 1 January 1955. 
Sulzberger suggested that Ho, fearful of Chinese domina­
tion, might seek to play off China against France and 
to act as a sort of "Communist Nehru." New York Times, 
13 November 1954. 
167. New York Herald-Tribune, 29 August 1956. 
168. It should be remembered that the Geneva Agreements re­
quired the regrouping only of military forces, not of 
all supporters of one side or the other. There is no 
evidence that the DRV made any effort to encourage civil­
ians to move north, and, in view of the Viet Minh ' s  ex-
pectation that the country would be �eunified by elec­
tions, there was no reason to do so. 
169. Fatherland Front, p. 41. See also Hot' s  2 September 1955 
speech, ibid., pp. 44-45 r Ho ' s  New Year ' s  Day 1956 appeal
for intensification of the struggle for consultations, 
Facts and Dates, p. 47 1 and Ho ' s  6 July 1956 speech,  
Vietnam News Agency dispatch ,  6 July 1956. 
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conf ident" · about the poli cy of relying on elections.  170 In 
May Dong referred to the national reunification effort as 
" the sacred struggle of the Vietnamese people in the present
historical phase.  " He expressed confidence that the country
still could be united through peaceful means.  171  In July Ho 
was asked in an interview what would happe.n if no elect ions 
were held.  He answered : " In that case, the Vietnamese 
people will cont inue to struggle with greater energy to have 
free general el ections held throughout the country, for such 
is  the most cherished aspirat ion of the entire Vietnamese 
peo_ple • • • •  " When the idea that both Vietnamese governments 
might be admitted to the UN was mentioned to him, he replied 
negat ively, insi sting that: "Vietnam is  a whole from the 
North to the South. It must be unified. It cannot be cut 
in two separate nations any more than the United States can 
be cut into two separate nat ions . 11 172 
Another s ign that the DRV still was sincerely interested 
in el ections is  the report of Hanoi ' s  effort to win Diem'  s 
agreement to elections by offering to postpone them. On a 
number of occasions in 1955 and 1956 and through several 
intermediaries, the DRV lea.ders informed Saigon of their 
wi llingness to p<:>stpone the plebiscite and to appeal to a 
foreign arbiter. 173 If the DRV had viewed the election pro­
vision merely as a propaganda device to embarrass the Diem 
regime, it surely would have insisted on Diem ' s  keeping the 
original date.  Hanoi ' s  apparent reasonableness on the sub­
ject probably reflected a hope that Diem would agree to elec­
tions one, two, or three years hence, thus committing himself 
and enhancing the DRV ' s chances of ultimately gaini.ng peace­
ful reunification. 
The reason for Hanoi  • s continued a.dvocacy of elections 
is not ha rd to understand. The DRV originally had favored 
e lections because it expe cted to win, and in 1956 it could 
still be confident of victory. At the root of that confidence 
perhaps was the knowl edge that the north ' s  population exceeded 
that of the south by two or three mil lion ( out of roughly 30 
million total)  . But the expectation of a DRV victory cannot 
be explained solely or even principally i.n terms of the 
northern majority. Reports of the south ' s  poor prospects in 
the el ections rarely laid the cause at the lack of a free 
vote in the north whi ch \«>uld make a Communist victory auto­
mati c .  The strong support for the Viet Minh in the south is 
170 .  Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 29 Apri l  1956. 
171.  Vietnam News Agency di spatch, l May 1956 . 
172 .  Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12  July 1956. 
173 .  Lacouture, Between Two Truces, p. 68. 
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a crucial factor which simply cannot be ignored. Some ob­
servers believed that the Viet Minh actually was stronger
south of the 17th parallel than in the north.r1 74 During the 
two years after Geneva there was reason to believe that the 
Viet Minh's electoral strength in the south remained con­
siderable.r175 Thus, an 8 October 1955 Economist article 
stated: 
The mass of the people in the south favor the Com­
munist regime in the north, but for reasons of national­
istic sentiment rather than because of any doctrinaire 
attachment to Communism. They have been strengthened
in their allegiance since Geneva by the high-handed and 
inept actions of Diem. The kind of argument one hears 
is that the choice lies between an efficient dictator­
ship in the north and an inefficient dictatorship in the 
south. 
The Economist also perceived a significant swell of support 
in the south for the holding of reunification elections: 
Many Vietnamese in the south have been criticizing
Diem for his refusal to meet the Viet Minh leaders for 
discussions about the organization of national elections. 
There may well develop a really spontaneous and massive 
demonstration by the people of southern Vietnam to de­
mand elections. Mr. Diem will then be faced with the 
choice of acceding to their demands, and certainly lose 
the election, or of opening fire on his own people and 
being overthrown by force.r176 
Althrough by the spring of 1956 Diem had indeed strengthened
his control of the government beyond what most had thought
possible, it is important to remember that Diem's remarkable 
achievement in eliminating his rivals for political power in 
Saigon did not mean he had acquired the broad base of popular 
1 74. Ellen J. Hammer, The Stru le for Indochina Continues 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955 , p. 22. 
175. On Viet Minh strength in the south during the first year 
after Geneva, see New York Times, 24 October 1954, 23 
December 1954, 31 December 1954, 20 May 1955, 8 June 
1955, 23 June 1955, 17 July 1955. 
176. See also Eastern World (London), November, 1955, p. 11,
which reported that Diem ' s  refusal to consult on elec­
tions had alienated liberal elements in the south who 
feared that a failure to meet with the north would pro­
duce a new war. The article also reported widespread 
opposition to Diem among the peasantry, stemming par­
ticularly from Diemr' s  failure to institute land reforms. 
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support needed for success in a free election 1t177t- on the 
contrary, he had done little to win such support. 
Despite the evidence that the DRV was rightly confident 
of victory in the elections, some have maintained that the 
DRV's willingness to allow the 1 956 deadline to pass without 
incident suggests that Hanoi had by then lost real interest 
in the elections because of the problems encountered in its 
land reform program. This argument ig.nores several facts. 
It was not until the summer of 1956 that the DRV leaders came 
to realize that they were confronted by a severe internal 
crisis.t178 on 17 August Ho admitted that errors had been 
made. The Nghe An peasant uprising, the most spectacular
manifestation of discontent in the countryside, did not occur 
until November. Thus, the DRV's policy on how to react to 
the _passing of the July deadline was certainly formulated 
and probably executed before the gravity of the agrarian 
_problems was known. 
Furthermore, while it would be wrong to minimize the 
seriousness of the difficulties faced by the DRV in late 
1956, it does oot necessarily follow that Hanoi was signifi­
cantly less willing to hold reunification elections. Even 
after the extent of the land reform failure became clear, 
the DRV continued to seek the co-chairmen's intervention to 
force the Diem government to fulfill the Geneva Agreements.
On 15 August Dong sent a note to the co-chairmen approving
the USSR'ts 21 July proposal that the co-chairmen recommend 
that Diem set a for consultations a.nd elec­immediately date ·
tions. Dong insisted that Saigon could not continue to speak
of unity while refusing to discuss elections and renewed his 
demand that a new Geneva Conference be convened if Saigo.n
failed to comply. As a further sign of his sincerity, Dong
pledged that if there was an agreement to hold elections, 
177. An editorial in The Times {London) ,  9 March 1956, sum­
marized Diem'ts achievement in this way: "The liberal 
intellectuals have been silenced in one way or another r 
the gangster organization of the Binh Xuyen has disinte­
grated 1 the Cao Dai General Nguyen Than Phuong has 
brought his forces over to the Government and deposed 
his 'tpope. '  By no means all of the countryside is firmly
administered by the Government in Saigont. But at a.ny 
rate organized armed resistance has been ended • • •• A 
year ago Mr. Diem refused national elections on the 
grounds that there was no guarantee of democratic free­
dom in the north. If he has asserted his own power by
equally undemocratic methods, it has nevertheless been 
asserted.t" 
178. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams ( New York: Praeger, 
1964) ,  p. 155. 
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al l questions connected with their organization and supervi­
sion would be submitted to both sides for mutual agreement .r179 
And on 22 November, just days after the Nghe An uprising, the 
DRV and China issued a joint communique condemning the Saigon 
regime and the US for prolonging Vietnam's division and de­
manding that the members of the Geneva Conference t ake action 
to ensure the implementation of the Agreements. Although this 
cormnunique probably was primarily an effort to extract fur­
ther action from the USSR,  it may also have been issued in 
the hope that Britain, then on very bad terms with the US be­
cause of the Suez crisis, might reverse its earlier stand on 
the issue of e lections in Vietnam.r180 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the north's an­
ticipated margin in the elections was such that it is hard to 
imagine that discontent about the land reforms could have 
seriously threatened the DRV with defeat in the electionsr. 
Many of the DRV's problems stemmed from the country's divi­
sion, and one would expect that under those circumstances 
pressure for reunificration would increase, not decline. While 
reunification would not have solved the land reform problems, 
it would have relieved economic and social pressures181 there­
by removing some of the causes of tensions i.n the countrysider. 
It really is hard to see why the DRV would have reacted by
losing interest in the elections to problems some of which 
might have been at least partly alleviated by reunification. 
The fact remains that the DRV did allow the election 
deadline to pass without undertaking drastic action. Many 
were surprised at the restraint shown by the DRV in the face 
of the frustration of what it felt were its legitimate claims. 
In view of the fact that recourse to violence eventually was 
taken, it is imi;x:,rtant to understand that throughout the two­
year period there was an expectation that Diem 's failure to 
allow elections might lead the DRV to violence,  and, many
said, such a course on the DRVr's part could not be considered 
wholly unjustified. Immediately after the Geneva Conference, 
the New York Times had remarked that if the scheduled elec­
tions did not take place, the- Viet Minh would have "a good 
excuse for making trouble.r11 182 On 16 July 1955 the Economist 
asserted: 
179r. New York Times, 15 August 1956.  
180. This is  suggested by Hinton, Communist China, pp. 338-
339r. 
181.  Seerp. 39 above. 
182 .  New York Times, 25 July 1954. 
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• • •  no western representative can possibly advise Diem 
to refuse to confer with the Viet Minh. To do so would 
be to invite either Communist-inspired civil disturb­
ances in the South, or, eventually, a military attack 
which the nationalists would face without allies in the 
fieldr. 
On 2 1  April 1956, as the deadline approached, the Economist 
warned that Diem ' s  refusal to participate in elections "con­
stitutes a provocation to the Viet Minh to launch a wa.r 
against the Nationalist south • • r• •  " And the New York Herald­
Tribune, writing after the passing of the deadline, said: 
"These [southern Viet Minh] undergrou.nd workers had doubtless 
expected to play a decisive role in the election that never 
came off. Now their only future is subversion.r11 183 
Though it ultimately did respond to Diemr' s  "provoca­
tion, "  why did the DRV fail to do so in 1956? The DRV's 
failure to renew hostilities undoubtedly reflected at least 
to some extent its reluctance to engage in another war with­
out havring recovered from the considerable devastation of 
the first. But perhaps more important was the unwillingness
of the Russians or the Chinese to support such a move. There 
was, in effect, a basic conflict of interests between the 
DRV and its Communist allies. The Soviets were not eager to 
establish the precedent of free elections in divided coun­
tries for fear that the West would insist on applying the 
same principle to Germany and Korea ,  where a Communist vic­
tory was u.nlikely. Most important, the Soviets were anxious 
to avoid a major warr. The SEATO umbrella over Indochina and 
the US gover.nment 's strong support for Diem clearly made the 
consequences of a DRV attack uncertainr Vietnam appare.ntly 
was too far from the USSRr' s  central interest to be worth 
such a risk. Perhaps the most striking example of the USSR 's 
willingness to sacrifice the DRV ' s  interests for its own was 
Moscow's 1957 proposal that, as part of a package deal to 
include the two Koreas, both parts of Vietnam should be ad­
mitted to the UN.r184 
183r. New York Herald-Tribune, 29 August 1956 . For additional 
reprersentative statements of the view that the south 
would either have to accept the elections or be prepared 
for a Viet Minh resumption of violence, see New York 
Times, 11 August 1955 ( statement of the Canadian ICC 
Member ) and 8 January 1956. 
184r. The DRV, which opposed the admission of both Vietnams 
to the UN ( seerp. 4 1 ,  above ) ,  never publicly acknowledged
the Soviet proposal. Hanoi vehemently attacked Saigonr' s  
effort to gain admission alone, arguing that neither 
part of the country was qualified for membershipr only 
a reunified Vietnam could join. Hanoi praised the USSR 
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Though the Chinese were more deeply concerned than the 
Sovirets about the future of the DRV, Vietnam was still much 
less important to Peking than other questions, _particularly
Taiwan. China, like the USSR, was in the midst of _promoting 
a _policy of peaceful coexistence and detenter like Moscow, 
Peking was probably unwilling to sacrifice that policy for 
the sake of Vietnamese reunification, even under Communist 
auspices. Furthermore, if Peking's fear of a major war in 
Indochina had led Chou En-lai to urge moderation and compro­
mise on the Viet Minh at Geneva, that fear of war probably 
was at least as great in 1956 as it had been in 1954. Finally,
it is even _possible that Peking preferred a divided Vietnam, 
keeping the DRV dependent on China for its food sup_ply .r185 
In any case, however inviting and however justifiable an in­
vasion of the south might have seemed to Hanoi's superior 
army, the DRV's economic dependence on its Communist allies,
es_pecially China, would have been a severe restriction on any
plans to move against the south.r186 It is quite likely that 
the DRV was wary of involving itself in a situation in which 
it might have had to face both Diem and the US without strong
Chinese or Sovi et support r such a situation would have jeo_p­
ardized the very existence of the DRV. 
for its veto of the Saigon effort. See New York Times, 
25 January 1957 and 31 January 1957rr and Vietnam News 
Agency dis_patches of 26 January 1957, 30 January 1957,
and 12 February 1957. The Soviet pro_posal was rejected
by the UN S_pecial Political Committee by a vote of 45 to 
12 (with 18 abstentions) .  The same committee approved
the 13-power motion to admit the Republic of Vietnam by 
a vote of 44 to 8 (with 23 abstentions ).  Only the Com­
munist countries voted against the Republic of Vietnam, 
while the abstainers included Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Egypt,
Finland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, and 
Syria. No country breakdown is available for the vote 
on the Soviet proposal but it can _probably be assumed 
that four of the 23 abstairners just listed joined the 8 
Communist countries in su_p_port of the DRV. See United 
Nations General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Official 
Records-Special Political Committee, 22nd Meeting, 30 
January 1957, p. 105. 
185. The above analysis of Soviet and Chinese unwillingness 
to sup_port a DRV renewal of hostilities is largely drawn 
from Brian Crozier, "The International Situation in Indo­
chirna, 11 Pacific Affairs, XXIX, no. 4 (December, 1956 ) ,  
31 1. 
18 6. Ibid.r, 312-313. For details on the DRV's economic de­
pendence on her Communist allies, see Brian Crozier, 
"Indochina: The Unfirnished Struggle,r" The World Today, 
12, no. 1 (January, 1956 ) .  
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It should be manifest that the DRV had a very serious 
interest in holding the 1956 elections, and that it did all  
it could, short of violence, to bring them about. But some 
wil l  stil l discount the DRV ' s  efforts and argue that Hanoi 
never could have permitted free elections because no Com­
munist state has ever done so. This argument has been at the 
heart of the US and Saigon positions. It in essence holds 
that a Communist state is by definition incapable of ever 
permitting a free election. 
There is reason to question the validity of that argu­
ment. Apart from the fact that the Geneva Agreements did not 
sti_pulate any _preconditions on which the holding of elections 
would de_pend, it should be recalled that it was a generally 
acce_pted fact that the Viet Minh held substantial popular 
su_pport which would have given it a victory even in "real ly 
free" e lections. If a Viet Minh majority was anticipated by 
everyone, even President Eisenhower, is it reasonable to 
assume that the DRV would have felt it necessary to coerce 
its _po_pulation or to rig the election in some way? If Com­
munist governments have been known to rig elections, they
have also been known to show considerable tactical f lexibility 
in using whatever method seems to promise the greatest gain
at the lowest cost. The simplest way for the DRV to gain 
control of al l Vietnam would have been to permit free elec­
tions. To say that the DRV had an interest in permitting
free elections is not to say that Communist governments in 
general "WOuld permit them or even that the DRV would always 
allow them, but only that the DRV might have allowed them in 
1956 because it was confident of victory. To assume that 
every Communist state is under some sort of irrepressible 
compulsion to rig every election seems unwise. While no one 
really can say what the DRV would have done, it does not seem 
necessary to assume that the DRV would have rigged an elec­
tion it could have won honestly just because other Communist 
governments, under different circumstances, have rigged them. 
Besides the DRV ' s  good pros_pects in a free election, it 
is surely of some relevance that the DRV responded to Saigon 's 
accusations by spelling out its own understanding of "free 
el ections" in rather more reasonable and realistic terms than 
Diemr' s  insistence that the DRV disavow Communism.r187 On 
187. There was an unofficial report in the Saigon vernacular 
Ngon Luan, 29 July 1955, which was somewhat more specific
than Diemr's statements about the north's need to put the 
country's interest ahead of Communism's, guarantee fun­
damental freedoms, etc. The report listed the charac­
teristics the DRV must have to prove it was "democratic" :  
"_political o_pposition in the Government, basic freedoms 
for the _peo_ple, army and _police outside the control of 
the _party, freedom of the press. 11 Then the UN was to 
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6 June 1955, Pham Van Dong declared at a press conference that 
the DRV "stands for free general elections throughout the 
territory of Vietnam with all the guarantees necessary for the 
preparation, organization and conduct of general elections, in 
particular, guarantees of freedom of electioneering activities 
for all political parties, organizations and individuals.r11 188 
In September 1955 Dong further elaborated the DRV's 
understanding of free elections in a speech to the Fifth Ses­
sion of the National Assembly discussing the _program of the 
Fatherland Front. In Dong's words: 
The basic principles that govern these general elec­
tions are: general free elections throughout the coun­
try on the principle of universal, equal, direct and 
secret ballotr. It is universal in the sense that all 
Vietnamese citizens, including armyrnen and army officers,
without distinction of sex, nationality, social class,
profession, property status, education, religious be­
liefs, political tendency, length of residence, etc•r • • •  
shall have the right to elect and be elected. It is 
equal in that every elector shall cast one vote, and all 
votes shall have equal value. It is direct in that the 
people will directly elect their deputies to the National 
Assembly, and not through any intermediary. It is secret 
in that the ballot papers are in closed envelopes. All 
the above-mentioned conditions are to ensure that the 
elections will be entirely free and there can be no in­
terference, no threat that might prevent their electors 
from freely expressing their will. 
As stipulated by article 7 in the Final Declaration 
of the Geneva Conference, control of the elections shall 
be exercised by the International Commission for Super­
vision and Control •• • • 189 
Ho Chi Minh, when asked about safeguards for free elec­
tions, replied: "This is a calumny by those who do not de­
sire the reunification of Vietnam by means of free general 
elections. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet­
nam will guarantee full freedom of elections in the North of 
Vietnam. 11 190 Ho was more s_pecific in two letters he wrote 
to the editor of Nhan Dan. On 17 November 1955, he elaborated 
his view of free elections: 
make an inspection to determine whether the DRV was demo­
craticr. Only at that _point could elections be organized. 
Quoted in Murti, Vietnam Divided, pp. 186-187. 
188r. Ibid.r, p. 182. 
189. Fatherland Front, pp. 4 1-42. 
190 .  Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 July 1956. 
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FREE ELECTIONS: All the Vietnamese citizens, male 
or female above 18 years old, regardless of class, na­
tionality, religion, political affiliation , have the 
right to participate in the electionst, to vote freely 
for the ,persons in whom they have confidence. 
FREE CANDIDATURE: All Vietnamese citizens, male 
and female above 21 years old , also with the above-men­
tioned non-restriction clauses ,  have the right to stand 
for election. 
FREE CANVAS: All Vietnamese citizens, whether from 
the North or the South, have the right to canvass freely
throughout the country through conference, leaflets, 
,press, etc. The Government of the North and the author­
ities of the South should ensure the liberty and the 
security for all citizens during their activities for 
elections. 
METHOD OF VOTING: Totally equal, secret and direct. 
In short , t1 the Vietnamese people and the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure complete 
freedom and democracy to the nationwide elections ( as 
,provided in the Geneva Agreement). 
In his second letter, written on 25 February 1956 ,  Ho 
_proposed. a method by which the Western nations could judge
which part of Vietnam really had democratic freedoms. He 
offered to ,permit any number of representatives of the south­
ern zone to campaign in the north. The DRV would guarantee 
their complete security and right to campaign freely and to 
distribute their electoral ,propaganda, provided the DRV' s 
representatives were allowed to do the same in the south.t191 
Whether or not the DRV would have lived up to those con­
ditions cannot be known. One can at least say that the con­
ditions described above were exemplary of a free election. 
But the Saigon government and the US refused even to consider 
the ,possibility that the_ DRV could permit a free electiont1 
they argued that the lack of freedom in any Communist country 
made it impossible to hold a free election there. Yet, such 
concern about the absence of prerequisites for a free elec­
tion seems not to have deterred the US from proposing free 
elections in Gennany or Korea, where the non-Communist part
of the country was certain to win.t192 In effect, the lack 
of freedom in Communist-ruled areas has been raised as a 
191. Both letters are from Murti, Vietnam Divided, pp. 187-
188. 
192. One such proposal was made on 4 November 1955. The 
Western "Big Three" plus West Germany jointly proposed
the holding of a free election in September 1956 to 
unite the two parts of Germany. New York Times, 5 
November 1955. 
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barrier to free elections only in Vietnam, where the Commu­
nists were expected to win, and not in divided countries 
where a Western victory was anticipated. It is hard to avoid 
the conclusrion that the US was less concerned about the con­
ditions of voting than about the likelihood of an unfavorable 
outcome. 
Moreover, the unwillingness of the Saigon regime and the 
US to consider elections under such conditions as those pro­
_posed by Ho and Dong is, to say the least, ironic in view of 
the circumstrances that characterized Diemr' s  rule in general 
and the elections conducted under his aegis in particular.
In August 1 954 Diem established sedition courts to deal with 
Icases threatening Vietnam s "national inde_pendence" and 
"public security, 11 _particularly with respect to acts aimed at 
"overthrowing the national government.r11 193 The arrest and 
im_prisonment by the Diem regime of those who merely advocated 
free nationwide elections--among them the Saigon lawyer,
Nguyen Huu Tho, later to become the leader of the National 
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam--was a significant
commentary on the credentials of the Saigon government to 
pass on whether the DRV was qualified to hold free elections. 
With respect to freedom of the press, the Saigon government 
announced in late August that it was considering the "possi­
bility" of abolishing domestic political censorship.r194 Tha.t 
possibility apparently was rejected. As the London Times 
(among others) pointed out, that suppression of opposition 
which was criticized in the north had already occurred in the 
south.r195 According to B. s .  N. Murti, an Indian member of 
the ICC, various "mopping u_p" operations and re_pressive cam­
paigns against former resistance members drove them to the 
jungles and eventually to guerilla activity.r196 As Sulzberger 
described the situation in March 1955, the Diem regime was a 
"barren dictatorship,r" which could not ex_pect to overcome the 
ap_peal of the Viet Minh with "unborn democracy and ineffec­
tive dictatorship. 11 197 
It is noteworthy that Diem's hastily arranged referendum 
between himself and Bao Dai in October 1955 probably was 
illegal, because Bao Dai, who had appointed Diem premier, 
withdrew his mandate several days before the referendum {the 
1 93 .  New York Times, 4 August 1 954. 
1 94. New York Times, 3 1 August 1 954. 
195. The Times (London), 18 August 1 955. 
196. Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 196. 
1 97. New York Times, 12 March 1 955. 
ly decrie s.  11 203 
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loca� pa_pers fa iled to report that Diem had been dismissed ) .  198 
Bao Da i also never agreed to participate in the contest. But 
the question of the e lection ' s  legality i s  minor compared to 
other problems . The referendum reportedly was rigged by the 
premier ' s  brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. 199 Diem received 98.  2% of 
the votes .  The voting procedure itself seems not in the best 
tradition of secret balloting. The voter tore off one half 
of a picture ba llot and put it in a sealed envelope. 2 00 One 
wonders what was done with the other half.  
With respect to the March 1956 constituent a ssembly 
election which the State Department praised as  relatively 
"fair,  11 2 61 there were numerous restrictive provisions .  The 
gov ernment kept the right to veto candidates of whom it dis­
a_p_proved. Campaign f inances,  transport , and _propaganda were 
_provided exclusively by the government . By a presidential 
decree of 11  January 1956 concentration camps were set up to 
house fami lies of former Viet Minh supporters and current 
pol it ical prisoners . All opposition parties boycotted the 
election. Several independents had their candidacy suppressed. 
Sus_pected electora l opponents of the Diem regime were arrested. 
And once el ected, deput ies were to be immune from arrest only 
if they refrained from supporting the policies or act ivit ies 
of rebels or Communists.  2 02 An informat ive report of the 
condit ions in which candidates operated in a Republic of 
Vietnam election is  _provided in an art icle by Nguyen Tuyet 
Mai ,  a candidate in the 1959 National Assembly elections.  In 
her words:  " • • •  the essence of South Vietnamese politics is 
as tota litarian the regime in the North which it 
As Robert Shaplen put it , 
strong­as so 
the National 
198 . Murt i ,  Vietnam Divided, p. 141 . 
199 . Robert Sha_plen, The Lost Revolution ( New Yor.k : Harper,
1965 ) ,  p. 129. That the referendum was rigged is  also 
reported by Bernard B. Fall,  "How the French Got Out of 
Viet-Nam, " in The Viet-Nam Reader, p. 89. Scigliano, 
Nation Under Stress ,  P• 2 3 ,  suggests that the referendum .
"recalls  elections in Communi st states.  " 
2 00.  New York Times,  24 October 1955. In fact , in a later 
election the Viet Cong capital ized on this procedure by
announcing that anyone who could not produce an unused 
bal lot picture of Diem the day after the election would 
be punished. 
201.  New York Times ,  11  March 1956. 
2 02 . The above description of conditions in the constituent 
assembly elect ions i s  from Murt i ,  Vietnam Divided, pp.
192 -193 . 
2 0 3 .  Nguyen Tuyet Mai ,  "Elect ioneering: Vietnamese Style ,  " 
As ian Survey, II,  no. 9 ( November 1962 ) ,  11-18.  
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Assembly chosen in 1956 and 1959 was a "completely controlled 
body. 11 204- Tht1s, even if one assumes the worst about the DRVr' s 
promises about electoral conditions, it seems questionable
whether the election in the north could really have been much 
less free than that in the south.r205 
While it is impossible to s_peak with certainty of Hanoi Is 
intentions, it seems undeniable that the DRV did almost every­
thing possible to facilitate the holding of elections. From 
1954 to 1956, the DRV behaved largely as one would expect a 
country sincerely interested in carrying out the Geneva Agree­
ments' election provision to act. On the other hand, Diem,
clearly conscious that he w-ould lose the election, was under 
heavy domestic political pressure completely to eliminate the 
_possibility of elections and thus to demonstrate that Commu­
nist rule was not " around the corner.r11 206 Diem's refusal even 
to consult probably also reflects a fear that the DRV might 
have agreed to any reasonable conditions he imposed. The 
conclusion seems inescapable that the 1956 elections were not 
held because the Diem government, with important US backing, 
was more interested in maintaining itself as a separate, anti­
communist government than in risking its survival to achieve 
the national unity to which all Vietnamese ostensibly were 
committed. 
204. Shaplen, Lost Revorlution, p. 130. 
205. As Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 188, points out, it is 
.note\-X)rthy that despite the enormous number of DRV com­
plaints about the lack of freedom in the south, Hanoi 
never made this an issue with reference to the elections. 
This is another sign that the DRV was seeking elections, 
not a propaganda victory. 
206. See, for example, New York Times, 17 July 1955, on Diemr' s  
awareness that he would lose and on the political pres­
sures leading him to reject elections. Ellen Hammer, 
"Viet Nam, 1956,r" Journal of International Affairs, X, 
no. 1 {1956r) ,  35, asserts that the fear of elections had 
a "paralyzing effect" on the Saigon government. 
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EPILOGUE 
THE FAil,IJRE TO HOLD ELECTIONS: 
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT 
With the _passing of the July 1956 deadline for electio.ns ,
Hanoi began to stress that the struggle for reunification 
wourld be a. long and arduous one.r207 The DRV c,ontinued to 
base its appeals on the election provrision of the Geneva 
Agreements, holding both that the French (who had withdrawn 
their H igh Command in April 1956 ) were responsible for imple­
menting the Agreements untril they made arrangements for offi­
cially handing over that obligation to the Saigon government
and that the Re_pub.lic of Vietnam was already obligated as a 
" successor regime.r11 208 Efforts were made through 1960 to en­
gage the Diem government in consultations about elections. 
In June 195 7 Dong wrote to the Geneva Conference co-chairmen 
again calling on them to take steps to facilitate the holding 
of elections.r209 In July 1957 , March and December 1958, July
1959 , and July 1960 Dong addressed notes to Diem urging that 
he agree to the holding of a consultative conference to dis­
cuss reunification elections.r210 The DRV also sought to in­
stitute at least a normalization of relations with the south, 
which would _permit Hanoi to trade for southern rice. Diem 
rejected all of Hanoi ' s  offers, condemning them as " false 
pro_paganda.r11 211  The DRV consistently blamed Diem's refusals 
on pressure from his United States backers and, . in the face 
of repeated rejections, continued until at least 1958 to 
207. See, for example, Vietnam News Agency dispatch,  2 Janu­
ary 1957. 
208. see Seventh Interim Ree?rt of the International Commis­
sion for Su ervision and Control, Au st 1 ,  1956--A ril 
30 , 1957 (IJ:>ndon: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 19 7 )
[Cmnd. 335 ] ,  and Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 10 Janu­
ary 1957. 
209. Economist, 29 June 1957. 
210. See New York Times, 21 July 1957 1 Vietnam News Agency
dispatch, 9 March 1958 1 Vietnam Peace Committee, Five 
Years of the Implementation of the Geneva Agreements in 
V ietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1959), p. 8 1  and Devillers, "Struggle, "  10. 
211. New York Times, 17 March 1958 1 see also Problem of 
Reunification. 
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_pledge its determination to carry out more actively its ef­
forts to reunify the country on the basis of " independence 
and democracy by peaceful means.r11  2 12 
It is important to understand that Hanoi continued to 
view reunification as a goal the legitimacy of which was as­
sured by the Geneva Agreements. Inasmuch as Geneva had ex­
plicitly affirmed the unity of Vietnam and the non-political
character of the demarcation line, the DRV leaders undoubtedly
felt justified in continuing to hold that Vietnam was a single 
country, the reunification of which was essential. 2 13 Thus, 
2 12.  See, for example , New York Times , 17 April 1958. 
2 13. It should be noted that although the DRV has continued 
to insist on the im_portance of reunification, Hanoi has 
for some time maintained that even if the US were to 
withdraw, reunification would not come iinL�ediately. La­
couture reports (Between Two Truces, p. 246) that the DRV 
leaders had come to accept a delay of 10 to 15 years 1 
since the start of US bombing attacks on the north, that 
timetable has probably been compressed somewhat,  but even 
recently (Doc Lap, 14 October 1965) Hanoi has admitted 
that reunification must be "gradual.r" One must also con­
sider the NLFr' s  coolness toward early reunification (see
Lacouture, Between Two Truces , pp. 173, 245-246). The 
NLF _platform calls for reunification by "stages. 1 1 An 
apparent lack of enthusiasm for reunification also was 
manifest when the NLF held its first congress in January 
1962. It mapped out 10 points, and reunification was 
not among them. The congress also proposed the estab­
lishment of a neutral zone to include South Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos. A pamphlet written by two ORV citi­
zens native of the south discussing the NLF advocates a 
"Laotian solution" for South Vietnam. The pamphlet's 
principal mention of reunification is in a short section 
which begins by describing the problem as "particularly 
difficult.r" (See Tran Van Giau and Le Van Chat,  The 
South Viet Nam Liberation National Front [Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1962], pp. 32 , 34-35, 84 , 
and 87. The pamphlet also contains the information on 
the NLF congre·ss. ) Ironically , US bombi.ng of the north 
has had the effect of increasing the NLF's sense of kin­
ship with the ORVr. The increase in the NLF's emphasis
on reunification can be seen by comparing the above 
pamphlet with the NLF statement in We Will Win (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House , 1965), published
after the start of the bombing raids. Both Ha.noi and the 
NLF have consistently favored an irranediate "normaliza­
tion" of relations between the zones, which would enable 
the north to tap southern food sources again. 
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Secretary Rusk is correct in pointing out that "Hanoi has 
never made a secret of its designs.r11 2 14 For Hanoi sees re­
unification not as an invidious "design" that should be hidden 
but as a legitimate national (i . e. ,  encompassing all Vietnam) 
enterprise bearing the· approval of all present at Geneva.r215 
The extent and the character of Hanoi's effortsr.rto promote 
reunification after 1956 are, of course, matters of the great­
est controversy.r2 16 Although such questions are indeed 
214. Speech before the American Society of International Law,
Washington, D . c . ,  23 April 1965, in State Department 
Bulletin, LII, no. 1350, p .  698 . 
2 1 5 .  In fact, Hanoi has sometimes seemed to betray a sense of 
embarrassment that it was not doing as much as it should 
to promote reunification. Seet, for example, Hanoir' s  ef­
fort to rationalize the "consolidation of the north" as 
an integral part of the reunification struggle. Vietnam 
News Agency dispatches, 31 December 1956 and 10 January 
195 7 .  
2 16. Some analysts have asserted that the DRVr's effort to 
foster a change in the southern government's attitude 
toward elections consisted essentially of "_propaganda 
activities" u.ntil 1959 . ( See Scigliano, Nation Under 
Stress, p .  137, and New York Times, 2 May 1960.) Others 
have reported that the killing of village chiefs in the 
south began 1 1  wi thin a few mo.nths" after the passing of 
the 1956 election deadline, although the murders are 
attributed to "stay-behind" Viet Minh, not infiltrators 
from the northr. (See Fall, "How the French Got out,r" 
p .  91 . ) Some very knowledgeable writers have argued 
that the adoption of violent methods by southern Viet 
Minh su_pporters came largely a.s a response to Saigon I s 
repressive campaigns against them, an activity which the 
Diem government openly undertook a.s early as 1954 despite
the Geneva Agreementsr' prohibition of reprisals against
partisans of either side. Hanoi, that argument continues, 
feared becoming involved in a major war, but the south­
erners, subject to Diem ' s  repressions, were unwilling to 
wait i.ndefinitelyr thus, in respc>nse to southern pres­
sures culminating in the March 1960 meeting of "former 
resistance veterans, "  Hanoi that September agreed to en­
dorse the formation of a National Liberation Frontr. (For 
a development of the view that Saigonr' s  campaigns against
Viet Minh supporters led to the start of civil war in 
the south, see Lacouture, Between Two Truces, pp. 53-54, 
Devillers, "Struggle,r" 11-20, and Murti, Vietnam Divided, 
p .  196r. Concerning southern pressures on a reluctant 
Hanoi, see the Lacouture and the Devillers citations. )  
The State Department's vi_ew, of course, is that Hanoi 
sought first to overthrow Diem by encouraging its southern 
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important ones, it is not necessary to answer them in order to 
understand Hanoi Is p·erspective on the present situation. What­
ever the nature of Hanoi's involvement in the south and when­
ever it began, there can be no denying that eventual DRV ef­
forts to 11 sup_portr11 the 11 struggler1 1  in the south were a direct 
consequence of Diem's refusal to permit the scheduled elec­
tions. From the history of Hanoi's unsuccessful efforts to 
bring about the holding of the 1956 elections, some implica­
tions can be drawn about the DRV's understanding of the pre­
sent situation in Vietnam. 
The history of elections sheds some illumination on the 
DRV ' s  relations with the USSR and China. In a sense, the 
DRV's frustration in its efforts to achieve national reunifi­
cation through elections was a result not only of the US's 
su_p_port of Diem but also of the unwillingness of the major 
Communist _powers to exert strong pressure to secure the imple­
mentation of the Geneva Agreements. The ineffectiveness of 
Soviet and Chinese support cannot have failed to impress on 
Ho Chi Minh the disadvantages of dependence even on fraternal 
Comznuni st countries. Any tendency to view Hanoi simply as an 
extension of the Communist power of Moscow or Peking must be 
considered in the light of the DRV's past relations with its 
allies. It seems safe to assume that the DRV's experience
Ihas reinforced Hanoi s dis_position to follow a course inde­
pendent of its Communist allies. 
US officials have often expressed the view that Hanoi 's 
failure to respond affirmatively to Washington's peace over­
tures proves that the DRV is not interested in a peaceful
settlement of the war. But the DRV's experience in attempt­
ing to bring about the holding of the 1956 elections suggests
that there may be other reasons for Hanoi's failure to respond 
to us negotiation offers. 
In Hanoi there is a considerable reservoir of skepticism 
about any pro_posals emanating from Washington, and this atti­
tude of distrust should not be hard to understand in view of 
the us role in support of Diem's undermining of the 1956 elec­
tions. The DRV's leaders are convinced that the US was in­
strumental in Diem's refusal to allow elections. Their atti­
tude is well represented by this passage from an article in 
the army journal Quan Doi Nhan Dan: 
We demand the reunification of our land because for 
the last nine years the United States itself prevented 
followers to terrorize the countryside, and that when 
this effort failed to topple Diem, the DRV launched 
"aggression" by sending infiltrators to seize the south 
and set up a puppet Liberation Front to conceal its ag­
gression. (See the 196 1 and 1965 white papers on Vietnam 
published by the State Department. ) 
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any negotiation that would bring about a peaceful
reunification of the two parts. Even now the United 
States still stubbornly considers the south as a 
"separate country ( � ) 11 as it deliberately tries to 
prolong the division of our country.t2 17 
Can one really be surprised when US offers bring a response 
like this: 
Johnson proposed to solve the Vietnamese problem
by free elections, and he considered this proposal ••• 
a concession. This is nothing new. A free election to 
reunify Vietnam ••• is a matter ••• clearly specified
in the 1954 Geneva agreement. This election should have 
been carried out nine years ago, but it was precisely
the United States which, through the instrumentality of 
its henchmen, sabotaged the execution of this provision
••• these proposals are deceitful tricks••••218 
Furthermore, Hanoit' s  understanding of the nature of the 
war makes it very difficult for the DRV to accept US peace
offers. The DRV leaders see Diem's refusal to implement the 
election provision and his attempt to create instead an inter­
natiotnal boundary at the 17th parallel as a central cause of 
the current conflict. To the DRV, the goal of reunification 
appears not as an aggressive design but as the legitimate
fulfillment of the clear intention of the Geneva Agreements. 
Hanoi places considerable weight on the Geneva Agreementst' 
ex_plicit assertion that the 17th parallel was not to be con­
strued as a political boundary. The merit of Hanoit' s  position 
on this question has been acknowledged even in the West. As 
the London Times put it in 1956: 11There is the tacit Ameri­
can insistence that the Western powers party to the Geneva 
agreement should accept the fait accompli of a divided Viet­
nam •••• For both France and Britain it means that the inten­
tion of the Geneva agreement will have been frustrated and a 
d. 11 219charge of bad faith may be raise· Yet it is precisely 
on the acceptance of the notion that the 17th parallel con­
stitutes a legitimate political boundary that the US interpre­
tation of the war as 11 North Vietnam'ts aggression against 
South Vietnamt11 depends. The State Department'ts 1965 white 
_pa _per on Vietnam makes this assertion: " In Vietnam a Commu­
nist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sover­
eign people in a neighboring state.t" It is impossible to 
conceive of "aggression" of one state against another, when 
there is no legal basis for the existence of more than a 
217. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 27 September 1965. 
218. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 23 September 1965. 
219. The Times (London), 9 March 1956. 
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single state. To the DRV, the idea that South Vietnam is  ''a 
nei ghboring state" is an absurdity born of the US destire to 
retain a foothold in Indochina.t2 2 0  Thus Ho stated:  
•• • it is  a dishonest argument to say that the southern 
part of our country is a ne ighboring country separate 
from the northern partt. One might as well say that the 
Southern states of the United States are a country apart 
from the Northern states • • •  Vietnam is  one, the Viet­
nametse people are one •••• As sons and daughters of the 
same fatherland, our people in the north are bound to 
extend wholehearted su_pport to the patriotic struggle 
waged by the people of the south. 221  
While Hanoit' s  assumptions about us intentions are certainly 
open to doubt, it  is  not so easy to dismiss  the DRV's reasons 
for refusing to accept the us interpretation of the nature of 
the war. 
When the us asks for " some sign that North Vietnam i s  
willing to stop its aggress ion against South Vietnam,t" it i s  
calling upon Hanoi to accept Washi ngton ' s  interpretation of 
the war. Washington i s  asking the DRV implicitly, if  not ex­
_plicitly, to admit having committed aggress ion, when to Hanoi 
it i s  quite clear that Saigon and Washington are the guilty 
partiets--guilty of sabotaging the unity of Vietnam by refusing 
to allow the 1956 elections to take place. However much Hanoi 
may need and want peace, it is  unrealistic to expect the DRV 
to admit, even implic itly, that it has been an aggressor, 
when the facts of the last decade tell it otherwise. 
It is certainly beyond the province of this  study to 
sugge st what the US negot iating pos ition should be. But sev­
eral observations are posstible about the prerequis ites for 
successful negotiations. If the us wi shes to understand and 
to deal effectively with its adversary in Vietnam, it must 
recognize the reasons for Hanoit' s  d istrust of the us . Only
if the roots and the intensity of Hanoi's skepticism about US 
peace overtures are fully understood by Washington can effec­
tive steps be taken to dispel Hanoit' s  doubts and prepare the 
2 2 0. See the article by Do Xuan Sang, secretary general of 
the Vietnam Lawyers As sociation. The " shopworn plea" of 
Hanoit' s  " aggression" and refusal to abandon South Vietnam, 
he astserts, "preci sely goes counter" to the basic  prin­
ciples of the Geneva Agreements .  The attempt to build a 
separate state in the south is  11 out-and-out illegal" in 
view of the Geneva Agreements. Vietnam News Agency dis­
patch, 26 February 1966. 
2 21. Tass d ispatch, 9 December 1965, and Vietnam News Agency
di spatch, B December 1965. 
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way for effective negotiations. Furthermore, Hanoi is likely 
to remain unreceptive to peace proposals which treat the DRV 
as an aggressor being forced to the conference table by puni­
tive US bombings. Any rea l istic approach to negotiations in 
Vietnam must give at least some consideration to the DRVt's 
efforts to implement the Geneva Agreementst' election provi­
sion and to the manner in which those efforts were frustrated. 
6 0  
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